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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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28 March 1984

USSR REPORT MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

CHIEF GROUND FORCES POLITICAL DIRECTORATE POPKOV ON PATRIOTIC INDOCTRINATION

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83)
pp 2-3

[Article by Col Gen M. Popkov, member of military council, chief of political directorate of Ground Forces: "Implement June CPSU CC Plenum Resolutions: Indoctrinate Patriots of the Motherland"]

[Text] "Hello, dear countrymen..." is often the beginning of letters which arrive in our units and subunits from reserve soldiers. After parting with the military collectives, privates and NCO's tell in letters to former colleagues about how they are working in the national economy and what successes they have achieved. "Since being released to the reserve I have been working as a sovkhos driver," writes Jr Sgt (Res) N. Zaikin, for example, to his former subunit. He served in one of the units of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District. "I attained the title of communist labor shock worker and became a leader in socialist competition. . . . Thank you, Army, for giving me a good start in life and teaching me not to fear difficulties but to love my trade..."

The letter was read by the entire subunit, and it left no one indifferent. In that minute each person thought how service in the Army helped choose a reliable and sure reference point in life.

It is the primary concern of commanders, political entities, and the party and Komsomol organizations to develop a profoundly felt need to serve one's socialist Motherland selflessly, strengthen her might, be a patriot and internationalist, and struggle selflessly for that good, bright goal in which our party and our people believe and for which they strive.

The fact that a majority of Komsomol members and young Ground Forces personnel are distinguished by high political maturity, boundless dedication to communism's ideals, and a sense of responsibility for the Motherland's security and for the destiny of socialism and the world generates a feeling of satisfaction and great pride. They are doing everything necessary to raise even higher the level of combat readiness of the subunits and units, efficiency and discipline, and military schooling.

The personnel's high patriotic enthusiasm directed at successful implementation of resolutions of the 26th party congress and of the May and November 1982 and June 1983 CPSU CC plenums has become a vivid and noteworthy sign of military work. Socialist competition has gained broad scope everywhere among the troops and it has become an important means for indoctrinating the personnel in the process of military work and in assuring that they set examples in training and service.

The CPSU CC Plenum's resolution and our party's constant concern for strengthening national economic might and the country's defense potential and for improving the welfare of Soviet citizens generate pride in the soldiers for their beloved Motherland, awareness of being immediate participants in a nationwide cause, and unquestionably a sense of personal responsibility for their own military work. In a speech at the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum Comrade Yu. V. Andropov emphasized the exceptional importance of "each person having a profound understanding of party policy under today's conditions, being able to apply in practice the knowledge he gains, and gaining a clearer picture of his own duty and performing that duty in fact."

These words are full of special meaning. The task of steadfastly improving combat readiness and reliably safeguarding the Soviet people's peaceful labor clearly arises for every Soviet soldier from the detailed analysis made by the June CC Plenum of today's international situation and facts of increased military danger caused by aggressive aspirations of reactionary imperialist circles, and from the Statement by CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium Yu. V. Andropov.

Soviet patriotism, a genuine love for the socialist homeland and the best qualities of Soviet citizens--spiritual wealth, creative initiative, optimism, and conviction as to the correctness and invincibility of socialism--are displayed in service personnel in their selfless deeds and acts and in their conscientious attitude toward military duties.

Our Army life provides many wonderful examples of the soldiers' profound understanding and faultless performance of their duty. For example, WO [praporshchik] N. Bulakh enjoys great authority among his unit's personnel. He is the secretary of a tank battalion Komsomol buro and shows high party qualities in his work, realizing full well that being a Komsomol leader is not just a great honor, but also an enormous responsibility. This battalion's Komsomol organization is the best in the regiment. Activists aim primary efforts at further solidarity of the military collective, with the points at which their effort and knowledge are applied lying directly in the platoons and crews. This helps develop in Komsomol members and young soldiers in no better way a clear understanding of the objectives and missions facing the subunit and helps direct all the personnel's efforts at their quality accomplishment. For example, a movement under the motto "A higher level of mastery for new equipment" became widespread in the Komsomol organization. There is a determined struggle here for developing genuine masters of military affairs. WO Bulakh himself, a first class specialist, and other activists inspire Komsomol members by personal example to master equipment and weapons in an exemplary manner.

WO K. Yermagambetov earned the respect of colleagues (and not just Komsomol members, but also senior comrades) above all by his knowledge of the job, high exactingness toward himself and active participation in indoctrinating the personnel. The soldiers know WO F. Karpukhin as a tireless organizer of many patriotic initiatives who gives all the fervor of his heart to Komsomol work.

It was emphasized at the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum that "being a patriot today means strengthening our Motherland's economic and defense potentials steadfastly, improving one's readiness to defend the peace against all encroachments of the imperialist aggressor, and being conscientious toward military duties." What can be higher or more honorable than this purpose for the Soviet soldier? We rightly call those who set the example in combat training, service and discipline heroes of military routine. Komsomol member Pvt V. Gayevskiy can be included among them with full justification. During his service he became a Soviet Army outstanding soldier, second class specialist and ranking athlete and was awarded the "Combat Merit" medal. There are many such people in our units [chast' and soyedineniye] who give their all to service to the Motherland and who display patriotism and high moral qualities in daily combat training. Komsomol members in the military show their filial dedication to the Motherland, party and people by their every action: an accurate round, an excellent launch, or a combat training mission performed in an exemplary manner.

As was pointed out at the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum, the demands are rising objectively at the present time on the effectiveness and quality of ideological and political indoctrination work, especially in the development of a Marxist-Leninist outlook and communist ideology. It is a question of developing a class feeling and approach to phenomena of social life in all Soviet citizens and Army and Navy personnel and developing high political and moral-psychological qualities which determine the firmness of a person's ideological position.

The grand revolutionary, labor and combat traditions of the party, the Soviet people and their Armed Forces are a powerful means for indoctrinating Soviet patriots and are our great property. They gained special importance in connection with the 80th anniversary of the 2d RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Labor Party] Congress and with preparations for the 40th anniversary of the Soviet people's Victory in the Great Patriotic War, as well as for the 65th anniversary of the Komsomol and the 60th anniversary of the name of V. I. Lenin being conferred on the Komsomol.

The meeting on 15 August 1983 of CPSU CC General Secretary, Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, Comrade Yu. V. Andropov and CPSU leaders with party veterans was an important sociopolitical event and convincing proof of the monolithic nature of party ranks of all generations of Soviet citizens.

The permanent importance of patriotic indoctrination of young people was noted at the meeting in the CPSU Central Committee with party veterans. Party and Komsomol organizations are striving to take advantage of our rich historical heritage and the heroic exploits of Soviet military personnel during the Great

Patriotic War for this purpose. All this helps instil in young people in no better way an allegiance to sacred military duty, courage, staunchness and a readiness to stand up in defense of their beloved Motherland.

Through the initiative of Komsomol organizations, units and subunits hold theme nights, assemblies, meetings with Great Patriotic War participants, film festivals and readers' conferences, and prizes are instituted named for Heroes of the Soviet Union listed in perpetuity on unit rolls.

People of the older generation have something to teach young soldiers, and this is true especially for party and war veterans, who bear an enormous amount of life and combat experience and high moral qualities. It is a noble task of the veterans to give what assistance they can to commanders, political officers, and the party and Komsomol organizations in indoctrinating the homeland's defenders, and many of them perform this honorable task with great enthusiasm and a high sense of responsibility.

For example, a group of unit veterans arrived in one of the regiments of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District for a combat vehicle driving class. Among them was HSU Sr Lt (Ret) I. M. Pen'kov, who in the war years served in the regiment as a platoon commander. At the tankmen's request he told about the frontlinesmen's heroic acts and called on the soldiers to have a love for their equipment and weapons and know them thoroughly. Then after brief instructions he himself sat down at the controls of a combat vehicle and took it over the course.

Platoon commander Sr Lt A. Solodovnikov demonstrated high proficiency in this class, performing the exercise for a grade of "outstanding." Many of the platoon's soldiers followed the commander's example. It was pleasing to the war hero to see that the formidable equipment and weapons were in reliable hands.

Unfortunately, the ties with veterans are not firm everywhere. At times the veterans are invited to visit the soldiers only on major holidays and only to have them sit in the presidium of a ceremonial meeting. This also is important, but something else is of value: veterans must be given an opportunity to visit the subunits and the classes and perform lively indoctrinational work with the people.

The Party Central Committee emphasized the need to hold regular meetings with party and labor veterans and with representatives of different generations. A detailed study of works by Lenin, documents of party congresses and CPSU Central Committee plenums, and speeches by Comrade Yu. V. Andropov, and meetings with party veterans and heroes of labor and battles are of inestimable importance in the patriotic indoctrination of the Army youth. Gaining a heartfelt feeling for an exploit cannot help but leave an impression on a young soldier's soul.

There are major, large-scale tasks arising along the path toward improving developed socialism, and their successful accomplishment requires increasing efforts by all our people and a more substantial contribution to the common

cause by every Soviet citizen. The party is resting particularly great hopes on our youth, including for a subsequent strengthening of the Motherland's defenses and for the cause of defending socialism's achievements. It was noted at the meeting with party veterans in the CPSU Central Committee that something else cannot be forgotten: an overwhelming majority of today's young people are active participants in building communism and worthy heirs and continuers of their fathers' cause. But it is against that general background that instances of parasitism, labor and social passiveness and a lack of discipline inherent to a certain portion of the youth are especially intolerable. We must fight such phenomena resolutely.

This means we have to intensify indoctrinational work with young soldiers in every way, develop their active position in life and conscientious attitude toward performance of military duty, and see that they have a deep understanding of the need to show daily concern that the Komsomol contribution toward improving combat readiness is more specific and substantial.

What hinders this work, in our view? Above all, it is the instances where formalism and sham efficiency are displayed. Although seemingly many various activities are conducted, they do not always function as we would like, and this occurs because at times the external, ostentatious side gains the upper hand. It is therefore important for all indoctrinational work which is conducted to be combined more closely with the labor and ideological-moral conditioning of young people.

There also are problems and deficiencies in indoctrinational work in our Army environment. At times they show up in political passiveness and in the non-conformity of the acts and tastes of certain Komsomol members to the standards of socialist morality and military discipline. Unfortunately, the instances of young soldiers' unconscientious attitude toward combat training are not solitary ones. At times these soldiers violate regulation order and forget about the authority of the collectives in which they serve. The work style of certain Komsomol organizations and the level of party management of them suffer from a number of deficiencies.

A source of inspiration, a guarantee of success in the work of Komsomol organizations, and a guarantee of a further increase in their activeness and spirit lies in party management. Military councils, political agencies and party organizations of the Ground Forces pay much attention to the work of Komsomol organizations, constantly analyze the state of affairs in this important sector, and plan and implement specific steps to strengthen assistance to youth organizations. The status of the party's leadership of the Komsomol also is analyzed regularly along with other urgent issues at meetings of the party aktiv and in primary party organizations. An objective discussion about this also is going on at the reports and elections of party agencies now taking place.

The secretaries of Army and Navy Komsomol organizations will assemble for their conference in May 1984. The conference will generalize experience of Komsomol work gained in recent years and will discuss and develop practical steps to improve the role of Komsomol organizations in the struggle for high

combat readiness, firm military discipline, and a further improvement in the communist indoctrination of the Army and Navy youth.

The party teaches that we must work, and work constantly, with the youth. Party members working in the Komsomol (and there are many warrant officers and NCO's among them) are the immediate conductors of party policy among the troops and they comprise the fighting nucleus of Komsomol organizations. These people serve as a model of political maturity and discipline for the young soldiers. The party influence and efficiency of party members is higher in those party organizations where constant concern is shown for the development of this category of CPSU members and for developing in them a high sense of responsibility for the state of affairs in the assigned area.

The upbringing of the Army youth requires consideration of the features of those conditions under which young soldiers studied and lived before being called into the Army. We cannot dwell on what has been achieved or rest on our laurels, as they say, for it is a question of the country's future and the successful continuation of grandiose affairs which have been begun. "Time works for the youth," emphasized Comrade Andropov. "That is how it should be. It is important only to be confident that people coming to replace us never will forego the banner of October or Lenin's ideals and will know their jobs thoroughly and well."

Under today's conditions, where imperialist circles are whipping up international tension, systematically organizing ideological subversion against the USSR and countries of socialism and undertaking various kinds of provocations, and when demands are growing for vigilance and combat readiness, many issues are placed on the agenda involving a further improvement in personnel training and indoctrination. A great deal here depends on Komsomol organizations.

As demanded by the June 1983 CPSU CC plenum, their efforts must be focused on developing in Komsomol members and young soldiers an ideological conviction, high political vigilance and an ability to withstand the ideological subversions of the class enemy and his forays against socialism. It is important to assure that every soldier has a deep realization of the ever growing acuteness of ideological struggle and social significance of military labor and that he develops an immunity to the ideology and morality alien to us.

The patriotic and international indoctrination of young soldiers should be organized in an inseparable link with skillful, convincing propaganda of the advantages of the socialist system and the Soviet way of life. There should be a more convincing revelation of the beauty and grandeur of military labor and its indestructible tie with the reinforcement of our Motherland's might. Reasons for the increase in military danger and in the specific display of aggressiveness in the policy of imperialism, and the United States above all, must be made known to the personnel more thoroughly and intelligibly, and young soldiers must be helped to draw proper conclusions from this.

We have to strive to ensure that the cause of patriotic indoctrination is entrusted to people who would accomplish it not as just another burden, but

who would be able to appeal to the heart and mind of the young soldier with a great sense of responsibility and fervor.

Party members and Komsomol organizations can do a great deal to see that today's demands on ideological work are considered more fully in indoctrinating soldiers and that each measure be meaningful and satisfy more fully the spiritual needs of the Army youth. It is important that no one Komsomol member or young soldier remain outside the Komsomol organization's field of view.

In this regard, the activists' work style must be distinguished by a living tie with soldiers; daily, specific work in lower Komsomol organizations and a knowledge of the state of affairs in training and discipline; and of the Komsomol members' needs and wants. But even this doesn't wrap it up. We must be able to organize lively, vigorous work of the Komsomol organization and we must ourselves take a direct part in this.

The experience of the best Komsomol organizations teaches us that success comes where a comprehensive approach to indoctrination is assured, where a broad field is opened for the Komsomol members' initiative, and where Komsomol committees and buros in fact strive for unity of ideological indoctrination work and organizational work.

The unity of word and action is of enormous importance in indoctrinating the soldiers. We have no deficiency in discussions about discipline and about the need to create a healthy moral climate in every military collective, but it is important to reinforce the indoctritional importance of all work with daily organization of the job and with firm, regulation order. The Komsomol's help here must be most effective.

The role played by warrant officers and NCO's who are Komsomol members is important in strengthening discipline and creating a healthy moral atmosphere in military collectives. Privates are constantly within their view. It is important that an atmosphere of high comradely exactingness, mutual help, and public discussion of any unseemly act be formed in every team, crew and squad. Then the return from indoctrinational efforts will be considerably higher.

The Statement by Yu. V. Andropov declares: "Our country's defenses are at a level where I would advise no one to arrange a test of strength." Soviet military personnel fervently support the party line and they confirm allegiance to it through their actions.

Soldiers' military work is difficult, but it is needed by the Motherland and our people, since it serves to ensure peaceful conditions for building communism and to defend socialism's achievements on earth. "The importance of high combat readiness has risen especially now," says CPSU CC Politburo Member, USSR Minister of Defense Mar SU D. F. Ustinov. "This is above all because of the stepped-up aggressiveness of imperialism and of its military preparations and adventurism." In the final account, all work by commanders, political agencies and party and Komsomol organizations is subordinated to accomplishing the task of keeping combat readiness of the Armed Forces at a level guaranteeing an immediate rebuff to any aggressor. Soviet military personnel see in this their patriotic and international duty, and there is no doubt that they will perform it with honor.

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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

DESIRED CHARACTERISTICS GIVEN FOR KOMSOMOL SECRETARIES

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Koshelev, assistant chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy for Komsomol Affairs: "A Secretary Is Elected"]

[Text] There has been widespread preparation in the Army and Navy for the All-Army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries, which is to take place in May of this year. It will become a collective accounting on how the historical decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress and subsequent Central Committee Party Plenums, the directives and recommendations of Comrade Yuriy Vladimirovich Andropov and the decisions of the 19th Komsomol Congress are being put into practice.

The conference will make it possible to share experience of work and to outline ways of reinforcing the role of Komsomol organizations in the struggle for increasing combat readiness, strengthening military discipline and further improving communist indoctrination of young soldiers.

Today under a new heading we begin publication of materials devoted to the forthcoming conference.

He is in his fifth year as head of the Komsomol organization of the leading battalion of one of the units of the Red Banner Far East Military District. And all this time the battalion has been setting the tone in combat training and socialist competition. Undoubtedly, much of the credit for this goes to the commander and the party organization. But the contribution of the Komsomol leader Warrant Officer Valeriy Dan'ko is also ponderable. You see how the youth are drawn to him, hear the senior commanders' warm remarks about him and the words automatically come back to your memory: the secretary--the soul of the collective!

It is with pride that you note the fact that the absolute majority of such Komsomol leaders in the Army and Navy like Warrant Officer Valeriy Dan'ko are searching, active and fascinating. You think about this with special

warmth today, on the eve of the regular All-army Conference of Komsomol Organization Secretaries.

The right to be a leader.... Komsomol members acknowledge this lofty right only for those in whom they trust, in whom they see a model of communist conviction and moral purity. Prestige and respect do not come with the job of secretary. They come as a reward for labor and are found in the process of difficult, everyday work.

It is so important for a Komsomol secretary to be able to hear the heartbeat of the person next to him, to understand the man, to catch his inner state and to call for a good deed. But also if someone should be in trouble, he must not fail to support him at the right time. At times very much depends on this.

...In those days a group of servicemen of a certain unit were preparing for transfer to the reserves. Comrades decided to present each of them a souvenir in memory of their service together. They took up a collection. They entrusted one of the soldiers to make the purchases. After a few hours he returned from dismissal, but he had neither money nor souvenirs. "I lost it."--he merely sighed, his eyes cast downward.

From that day on many of the soldiers more or less stopped paying any attention to the soldier. Speaking of that, he did not have any close friends before and now became quite reserved and was not himself. Several times he attempted to talk to the Komsomol secretary about the incident. But the secretary saw it as an attempt to justify himself. Resentful of everyone and everything, the soldier soon committed a breach of discipline....

To be able to work with young people. There is so much behind that everyday phrase. One can "spin" everyday and solve dozens of problems, but things will stand still and life will toss up its difficult "why's" like from the horn of plenty. Why is the activity of the young people low? Why are they bored? Why, for example, in a unit situated on the outskirts of a major oblast center does the number of breaches of discipline suddenly increase after the arrival of new replacements? I was cold with what meticulousness Komsomol organization secretary Lieutenant I. Retryayev tried to find out the reasons.

At first glance, it all seemed simple: the soldiers were in a hurry to get photographs more quickly. But there was no photography studio in the unit. The Komsomol leader thought: why didn't he realize earlier that a young man, having put on his military uniform, rushes off to the photographer first thing. That he is eager to send his picture to his parents, friends and fiancée. Let everyone know--he is now a soldier!

Lieutenant Retryayev went to the commander and told him about it all. After a while the matter was corrected.

In such examples you are once again convinced of just how much is dependent on the initiative and concern of the Komsomol leader and on his knowledge and skills. However, these skills and knowledge become especially valuable

when combined with modesty, self-criticism and those qualities which, figuratively speaking, give life-giving shoots to all of the best in a person. But if there is a "worm-hole," even the brightest virtues begin to fade.

One can be an excellent specialist, shoot accurately and smartly lead a discussion, all the same, not have active contact with people. Certainly one has to respect a Komsomol leader who reads a great deal and keeps up with the latest in political, technical and artistic literature. But here the Komsomol members begin to notice: the learned comrade plainly "chokes up." Instead of simplicity in his manner there is arrogance and instead of benevolence--accentuated dryness. People begin to avoid such a good-for-nothing secretary and little by little move away from him. There emerges a paradox, when profound knowledge and a broad outlook, alas, only emphasize the negative character traits of the man called upon to rally the young people. One cannot count on success here.

There are many parts to the prestige of a Komsomol secretary, but I would especially like to single out the ability to attract others to oneself, to be a friend and adviser, the ability to talk heart-to-heart with a person and to listen in a way that the individual feels that his opinion is valued. This means to find a like-minded person.

I remember a candid admission of an acquaintance who was Komsomol committee secretary of a ship. Once a young sailor asked him if he could, as they say, talk with him not as a secretary but man to man....

Honestly, he continued, I was even taken aback by these words. And there and then I was not afraid to say to myself frankly: evidently, you are too official and cold if such questions arise.

It will be said to the secretary's credit that he was able to examine his own conduct and change for the better. The commander, political worker and other senior comrades were of great help to him in this.

Warm, I would say, cordial interrelations of a Komsomol leader with young people (precluding familiarity) and concern for their wants and needs have important meaning still and here is why. Having deeply studied the life of colleagues and their strong and weak qualities, it is easier to exert influence and give support in a difficult moment. People reach out and bare their hearts to someone who is modest and responsive.

Some people, unfortunately, forget about this. It is worthwhile for someone else, say, to be "in the presence of the command" for a certain period of time, put on the next star on the shoulderboards and it's as if they substituted for him. Not a trace remains of his previous behavior and the person becomes more "solid." This takes place before the eyes of colleagues, of those for whom he was a friend and adviser yesterday. I say, haven't you ever encountered this type of "Komsomol bureaucrat"? For him, to advise means "to give instructions" and not simply give, but only at a meeting from the rostrum. Sing and dance? Why, this is irreparable damage for prestige! Such a person quickly acquires bureaucratic habits, not understanding how destructive they are for working with young people.

It was a long time ago and I still remember the conversation with Senior Lieutenant Boris Varlamov, secretary of the Komsomol organization of a missile battalion. He also especially was concerned about prestige in the beginning. He used to play on the unit's hockey team, but was elected secretary--he layed down his ice armor. Earlier he sang on stage, now he considered it unimpressive. He became more and more engrossed in paperwork. He suddenly thought when he saw that people who only recently willingly used to come to him with joy or with pain, began to avoid him. "It is good that I changed my mind in time," Varlamov candidly admits, "and got down to live work."

Yes, the sooner the Komsomol leader will understand that they expect concrete deeds and not ringing phrases from him, the better. In other words, if you give a speech in a collective about the growth of professional skill--then, above all, try to increase your standing. You call them to the stadium--first wear a sports uniform. You get involved on the stage--stand in the choir or go to a dance or recital rehearsal. This is what we call a personal example. Its role is great in any affair--in the Komsomol too. In order to obtain good organization, a strengthening of discipline and high results in training and service from one's peers, a Komsomol buro or committee secretary himself must be in the front line and lead the young people. Should the situation demand it, he must take the place of a wounded comrade, sit behind the levers of a tank, stand behind the sights of a gun....

To become the best among the best and the first among equals and to work with triple the energy is, as we know, not an easy matter, but it is mandatory. The decisions of the December (1983) CPSU Central Committee Plenum are setting all of us to namely such an approach.

Elected Komsomol secretary.... We say these words and in a manner of speaking we beyond the distance of years the young, inspired faces of those who led their peers into saber attacks on interventionists and white guards. We see the Komsomol organizers of the fiery 1940's--heroes of the fierce battles with Nazism. And our peers are those who the Leninist party has entrusted to be the pioneers and builders of the Baykal-Amur Trunk Line (BAM), to labor in the Chernozem and other key sectors of the communist creation and who are carrying out their patriotic and international duty in the military.

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ARMED FORCES

READERS COMPLAIN OF SERVICEMEN'S APPEARANCE, BEHAVIOR OFF BASE

Veterans Decry Uniform Violations

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Nov 83 p 2

[Article by Captain 3d Rank A. Tkachev: "Through Veterans' Eyes"]

[Text] We will say, being favored with a poet's popular comparison, that a soldier in Russia is greater than a soldier. He is a son of the nation. And wherever he might appear, the nation looks on him with a parental wish for well, and with fatherly strictness.

"The Soviet nation is used to seeing its fighting men neat, smart, and absolutely properly dressed," recalled an inhabitant of the town of Slavyansk-on-Kuban, retired Major V. Karpovets. He served for 32 years in the Armed Forces. What, then, upset this veteran and prompted him to take up his pen? "I was in Krasnodar," related Vasiliy Fedorovich. "At a railroad station I saw servicemen walking about with uniform violations. I corrected its wear. But a military patrol closed their eyes to all this."

Karpovets tried to turn the patrol's attention to one particularly unusual appearance of a transgressor. And what did the senior member of the detail undertake? He condescendingly began trying to convince the veteran that all these people, shedding the dignity of military men, were no other than "transients"; that is, military conscripts in Krasnodar in transit. Therefore, he said, there was no reason for the Krasnodar commandant's office to be concerned with them. Let those who are authorized in the performance of their official duty concern themselves with them.

That is, it is to be supposed, the senior member of the patrol had in mind the immediate superiors of the undisciplined servicemen. He was correct in this. "But isn't the patrol duty really obliged to establish order everywhere that it is demanded?," asked comrade Karpovets. Of course it is obliged to, and for that very reason they wear the patrol dress while on duty. But the officer had no desire to interfere, judging by the situation, and he "shielded" himself from the veteran with clumsy excuses.

From Mogilev a veteran of the Great Patriotic War, retired officer M. Trikhanov, writes to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. He is disturbed by cases of the

appearance on city streets of soldiers, "whom, when looking at them, you simply don't believe are servicemen. The uniform of some of them is taken in until the seams split, and belts are down on the hips. Did they check these sorry soldiers before granting them leave to the city, as prescribed by regulation?"

You read the mail, in which these army and navy veterans communicate their concern because of these and similar cases, with a dual feeling. First of all you experience respect for the authors of the letters. These people, with their heart and soul, are drawn so much to the Armed Forces that they still consider themselves personally involved with its affairs.

But this very mail suggests concern. Its very existence points to the lack of work of those officials who are called upon, with no less interest than the veterans, to react energetically and positively to every case of uniform violation. Maxi-heels or mini-caps by themselves do not provoke the veterans' indignation. As men with service experience, they clearly see the disorder standing before them--the commanders' lack of exactingness and the individual servicemen's lack of discipline.

The veterans also clearly see another side of the question. That alteration to which the military uniform is subjected, by no means stems from a malicious character. Its source is the natural desire of every military man to look dashing and feel comfortable in uniform. The soldier's build is seen by the fit of articles of military clothing and equipment. It becomes unlawful and unnatural at that moment when homemade attributes of "prestige" are added unknowingly, as firmly established "stylish norms," to the expedient fitting by size and height.

For retired Colonel N. Smolyeyev, residing in Moscow, manifest dependence of this "narrow fashion" on fashion in general and its "youth echelon" in particular has occurred.

Psychologically, this occurs because there are young people in the military today who are used to following novelties of fashion and orienting on them. It is no wonder that they, from force of habit, continue to consider and regard the military uniform by the criteria of civilian dress. Not every recruit is capable of comprehending independently the special beauty and utility of the military uniform. Its particular autonomy, independence, and not being subjected to fluctuations of the "universal fashion" is needed in the meaningful explanations on the part of commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol activists, and military men of senior terms of service.

I believe that the veterans can only agree with this assertion.

Servicemen's Appearance Draws Complaints

Moscow. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Captain 3d Rank A. Tkachev: "In Everyone's View"]

[Text] "Believe me, there is not a sufficient power for me not to write you this letter!" On such an energetic note reserve officer I. Trofimov, an inhabitant of the city of Kozelsk, in Kaluga Oblast, began his dialogue with the newspaper. His voice is not alone. A report, "Through Veterans' Eyes," published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on 29 November 1983, affected many very deeply.

Retired Lieutenant Colonel F. Makarov, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, living in the city of Istra in Moscow Oblast, writes, "I am carefully following the publications of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA on the question of educating servicemen, and the struggle for strict observance of regulations on wear of the prescribed uniform by all military men regardless of rank and position held. The newspaper knows the correct line!" Other authors' responses support him. They consider it necessary to write regularly on this topic. To these veterans of the army and navy, having served in the ranks of the USSR Armed Forces for many years, it is surely absolutely clear that the outward appearance of a military man can never be a matter only of his personal taste. Those desires which are repeated in nearly every letter are absolutely fair. Patrol service can not give an easy time to undisciplined servicemen. In military units and on ships, control for observing the uniform must be carried out in full measure of lawful demands. Propaganda of our Soviet military uniform, its history, and its symbolism, must be conducted continually.

Readers' responses expand the initial bounds of the discussion. The veterans advise KRASNAYA ZVEZDA not to leave without attention such themes as the conduct of servicemen outside of the unit situation.

"Along the street of our village, a young serviceman walked in parade uniform," reports reserve Major S. Fen'ko, from Minsk Oblast. "He strode not on the sidewalk, but on the main part of the road, his jacket unbuttoned, and a bottle in each hand. How it pained me to see this loss of feeling of dignity and decorum, to say nothing of the basic norms of discipline!"

"Recently I had cause to be witness to a startling picture on a streetcar of the first route," writes retired Major L. Kots from Dnepropetrovsk. "The military patrol, consisting of four men headed by a senior lieutenant, comfortably sat on seats and next to them stood women, including elderly ones with shopping bags pulling at their arms. And how they looked at these strong men, for whom it would have been far easier than for the women to ride several stops standing! I have no doubts that this patrol was instructed, in the required manner, how to suppress violations of military discipline! But what prevents them from remembering, themselves, that every serviceman is always in view, and must conduct himself accordingly?"

"Individual officers, both young and not so young, sometimes even those gray with age, in sanatoriums, rest homes, and places for spending leave, allow

themselves to go about in any kind of strange dress," confides F. Makarov with his observations. Here, they wear pants and boots of military model, and civilian shirt and coat, frequently coarse and multi-colored. It happens also just the opposite. Some wear uniform jackets with faded worn jeans. People laugh at this 'special dress,' if you can call it that, on the quiet. At every similar meeting I become bitter in spirit and, though they are strangers, pity them for such obvious disrespect for the military uniform from the side of those who are called to defend its honor and dignity."

We all know this well. Wherever a serviceman is, he is also in view. And this is understandable. Besides everything else, the military uniform also possesses a quality, such that from the person to whom the authority is given to wear it, there is a special demand for his outward appearance as well as for his personal conduct. This demand must be, by regulation, strict in a unit, on board a ship, and in every military institution. But there need be no doubt that outside of the unit situation, so to speak, that demand remains just as strict on people and on the world. Because the Soviet soldier, sailor, and officer has a high and untained reputation. It is left to him as a legacy of several generations of predecessors. The sacred duty of every military man is to be at the height of this reputation in everything.

12198

CSO: 1801/183

ARMED FORCES

COMMANDER, POLITICAL ORGANS OVERLOOK OFFICER'S DRINKING PROBLEM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Col A. Andryushkov, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent: "The Knot: On the Subject of Ethics"]

[Text] The sheets of square-ruled copybook paper quivered a bit in Maj N. Zubin's broad palms. It was uncomfortable for him to read the confiscated letter with the office fastener: part of the letters in the upper corner were almost invisible. And it seemed that this officer with the exceptional physical might felt that he lacked the strength to remove the fastener that hindered him and look at the lines on the full extent of the page. For his son had written a letter to the editorial office.

That thought alone brought sweat to the brow of Maj Nikolay Filippovich Zubin, a military pilot 1st class, and commander of a transport aviation detachment. But he didn't notice it, as if in a difficult flight. Laying aside the letter, and without raising his tired, heavy eyelids, he began to speak. And his voice sounded hollow, having lost its former strength and self-assurance, with which it had been filled at the start of our conversation.

"I've been flying for many years. Everything has happened to me in the air. And nobody will tell you that Zubin is a weak man. But now I feel more alone than I have in my flying in recent years." Falling silent, he finished the thought with the unexpected word: "Songs...."

Childhood for Zubin had been severe: it was wartime. But it had given him good hard training. Life demanded independence early. And he had not been nudged into a flying career--he had chosen it himself. And training had been easy for him. And little by little the thought that he was not ordinary had developed.

And for Zubin, flying then was like a song. The fellow from the flying club did not take the sport plane high into the blue sky above the banks of the Volga, but the horizons that opened to him were unbounded, filling his heart with a thirst for the big road.

But he did not make up his mind until the end of the flight. Since that time, the pilot had spent thousands of hours in the air and mastered more than ten types of planes. And what planes! He had been one of the first in the Air Force after the test pilots to takeup "Antey", and had learned to fly these giants under army conditions.

He took these machines up to tremendous heights, but without noticing that he himself was sliding further and further down from it. Where did the slide begin? Perhaps after his first joyful flights, when he allowed himself a glass of wine, boyishly justifying it as "tradition"? Or perhaps when, at the start of his family life, he listened to advice from one of his more "experienced" friends, who were gathered around the table: "Put the question point-blank at the outset, Kolya: who is the master of the house?" Instead of wildflowers from the airfield, he had brought his young wife his condition: "Have a snack and everything that goes with it on the table after my flights!" A condition incompatible with a flying career.

"They never saw me drunk." Zubin's fingers nervously compress the mouthpiece of his Belomor into an accordion, and the movement of his eyelashes revealed weary, guarded eyes. "I was also never suspended from a flight because of it."

And the regiment's commander had no claims against Maj Zubin on this score. He gave his subordinate a good, but somewhat one-sided evaluation: a good pilot and an experienced instructor. His nature, true, was rather heavy, but this is no obstacle in a commander's work. A service evaluation, as we have seen, is not noted for depth.

And what is Maj Zubin the military pilot like in private life? And is everything going well with him in the service? Here the commander began to lack information on the matter: they say it's a strange family--nobody knows anything, and there's no desire to talk openly. Probably the latter, since the commander of the regiment could not but know that his subordinate, whom he had known for more than 10 years, long had not had a normal private life. The officers' family had fallen apart. Zubin's wife, unable to stand his conduct, had gone to live in a hotel. "She ran away!" Zubin flung out abruptly, blaming the woman for everything. After talking with the officer's wife, I understood: complex circumstances had probably compelled her to leave.

And what must the conduct of Zubin the father have been like if his son, a cadet at a military aviation school for pilots, wrote to the editorial office: "My father is a military pilot. He drinks. Mama has left him. Help our family...." And before this, Cadet A. Zubin had already appealed to the commander of the regiment for help. So that the private life of his subordinate officer outside the service could not have been "in the dark" to the regiment's commander.

Flying (I am not afraid of this word) did not set well with family life for Maj Zubin. But a real flight in the sky also begins on the ground. And all

that a pilot lives through on the ground, he involuntarily takes into the air with him. They sometimes say, in calming themselves before the start, that in going up into the sky they are leaving everything not necessary for flying on the ground. One can unburden one's flying jacket of one's apartment keys and leave them in the rest house until one's return. But memory is not a thing. True, one can conceal one's mood from everyone under the cover of an apparent external well-being, but it still remains with the pilot and will "work on him" in flight.

In flying Maj Zubin had long been taking off without the required spirit and attitude. The song, the inspiration, the sensation of the beauty of earth and sky, were missing. Everyday disorders had pushed them into the background. What was left? Irritability. Dissatisfaction with himself and his crew. The officer found no common language with his fellow servicemen: you don't earn authority with the voice of command alone. Particularly in the air. And the crew fell apart. Because of the complicated relationships in it, the navigator, Capt V. Gunar', submitted a request for transfer. The request was granted. Is it possible that this moment (let us note, a purely service matter) in the officer's life was "unknown" to his commanders?

No, Maj Zubin lived and lives, works, and spends his free time not in isolation, but among his fellow servicemen. Did someone perhaps try to help Zubin get out of this sucking quagmire, so to speak? Unfortunately, neither his commander, nor the political workers, nor his fellow servicemen took the necessary steps. Today it is hard to say when such an atmosphere took shape in the subunit, which until recently was commanded by Lt Col V. Chernobay, but everyone was left to himself here. To take an interest in each other's lives was considered almost as bad form among the squadron's officers and ensigns. They say that such is the peculiar nature of transport aviation that crews at times are separated from their subunits for long periods, and that it is hard for them to work systematically. Consequently, it is all the more important for the squadron's commander, its political worker, and the subunit's party organization secretary to know each man in depth.

Lt Col Chernobay knew a lot about his detachment commander, Maj Zubin. For several years they had lived on the same staircase landing. And more than once the squadron commander had gone to quiet his drunken neighbor. However, he did not "bring the litter out of the hut." His commander's unspoken "goodwill" still more untied Zubin's hands.

Maj V. Yelizarov, the squadron's deputy commander for the political unit, had not once spoken to him about his conduct. The party organization secretary, Maj V. Vizhukov, also did not consider it necessary to devote attention to the communist Zubin. True, Zubin had once been summoned to the squadron's party bureau in connection with an aggravated conflict with members of his crew. He was gently rebuked. The moral side of the question was not touched upon.

Zubin, feeling unpunished, did not forget to remind his wife and son of this.

"I brought up my son," affirmed Zubin, making a slip here," as it struck me. I was strict with him sometimes, but it was for his own good...."

And Zubin began to talk at length about how his wife had "spoiled" his son with her training and how he had "made" a man of him. And suddenly he fell silent, remembering the letter. He remained silent. This enforced silence weighed upon him. It would be awkward for conversation from any neutral starting point. But this was not so. For then Zubin continued talking. His words at first seem incomprehensible, but then they involuntarily stunned one with how much they revealed:

"You know, the parachutists have a special meaning for the term 'knot'. This is when, because of the packer's carelessness, a shroud falls on the parachute's canopy. Sometimes two shrouds. And then the canopy may deflate. The only way to escape is to cut away the main parachute and release the reserve. It seems that I am confronted with such a knot."

His family had broken up. All was not going well with him in the service. And Maj Zubin was not absolutely sure what he should do. And his commanders, political workers, and friends were in no hurry to help him arrive at the right decision.

This case is exceptional, but characteristic of our army. Moreover, it forces one to think: why did it happen? And in my opinion, Maj Zubin himself must answer this question. Since a "knot," in his words, has occurred in his life, he himself, who has fallen into it, has to act first of all. Of course, his son, the future military pilot, for whom family history has served as a bitter lesson in life, and at whose request I have changed his father's surname, hopes so too.

12462

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ARMED FORCES

BUREAUCRATIC FOUL-UPS IN MEDAL WINNER CASE

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Feb 84 p 2

[Article by Colonel A. Drovosekov: "The Road To A Medal"]

[Text] At the Shoskta Unified City Voyenkomat in Dedember 1981 former Sergeant Grigoriy Andreyevich Vashchina was given the Order of the Red Star which he had been awarded in April 1945 for bravery in battles against the fascists.

"And can't I get the medal for victory over Germany?" curiously asked Grigoriy Andreyevich before going home. "As a veteran of the front I should get it..."

"Write out a statement explaining why the medal was not presented to you at the proper time and we will look into your request," said voyenkomat [military registration and enlistment office] worker Major V. Deryugin who managed such matters.

Vashchina wrote the statement, explained everything in it and returned home to his native village elated. And he began to wait. One month passed, a second and a third. When eight months had elapsed he again went to see Major V. Deryugin at the voyenkomat. The conversation was brief.

"We need a certification that you did not actually receive a medal."

Vashchina didn't have such a certificate. As far as he knew, he had never been given one and now he needed it. Where could he get one and to whom could he turn for help.

It isn't necessary to list all the places he wrote. What is important is that in February 1983 one of his letters turned up at the Main Cadre Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense. Here they did what was required in this matter and they sent documents to the Cadre Directorate of the Kiev Military District. From there an official request was quickly sent to the Suma Oblvoyenkomat [oblast voyenkomat] that they deal with the statement from G. Vashchina in accordance with a regulation that had gone into effect as far back as 1981.

According to this regulation a veteran's statement must be reviewed at his local voyenkomat and the decision made on it together with other documents

must be sent to the Cadre Directorate of the military district for final disposition. And that's the end of it. Why this was not done could not be intelligibly explained in either the Shostka or Suma Voenkomats.

In mid-May 1983 G. Vashchina received the long-awaited news from the oblvoyenkomat that his documents had been given to the chief of the KVO Kiev Military District Cadre Directorate. After two months had passed he asked his brother to find out if any decision had been made on his case. His brother wrote and then he got the answer that is worth reproducing.

"The medal 'For Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945' was presented to Vashchina, Grigoriy Andreyevich on 26 June 1983.

Comrade Vashchina, your letter was written on 26 August, a month after your brother was given the award. Before writing to various places, you should make sure that you are right. You have bothered people who are very busy.

Suma Oblast Military Commissar Colonel N. Dunayev."

This letter amazed the brothers. What now! They get word that the presentation was made and a specific date is given but there was no presentation. How could such nonsense happen?

This very question was asked of me by telephone and of Colonel N. Dunayev. He thought for a minute and said, "We must look into this. Someone has given out some false information."

Of course it is necessary to investigate. It is also necessary for the person who misled the chief to get a good lesson for the future.

But let us return to Grigoriy Andreyevich who as earlier was in agony of suspense. Finally he received a letter which stated:

"Dear Grigoriy Andreyevich. You are invited to come to the city voyenkomat on 29 August 1983 to receive the medal 'For Victory Over Germany in the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945'.

Acting for the Shostka City Voenkomat Major Tregub."

Dressed in his finest G. Vashchina went to the voyenkomat on the appointed day.

"But we have no medal for you," said Mayor V. Deryugin in a lackadaisical manner. "You'll get it there."

"Then why did you send for me? At 80 years old and in my health it is difficult to get to town."

"What can you do--there has been a small mix-up."

With that the veteran returned home. Early morning on September 1 his wife told him to get dressed up.

"You're going to school. You are to be presented your medal in front of the school children. So be ready, they will call..."

The veteran sat at the window for an hour, a second and a third but no one called. Three days later the sel'sovet village council secretary N. Vasil'tsova came by and presented him with the medal. As Nadezhda Aleksandrova herself explained, it was presented to him as ordered by Major V. Deryugin, "in a family setting," i.e., in front of the veteran's wife.

It is certainly not worth writing about how bitter G. Vashchina was about the insult of such "attention." Did Major V. Deryugin understand how he had hurt the veteran? Hardly.

"I ask forgiveness from Vashchina since he is so touchy."

It appears that if Vashchina was not hurt, there wasn't anything to apologize for. As if nothing special had happened.

12511

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ARMED FORCES

CONCEALMENT OF MISSING MATERIAL REPORTED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 17 Jan 84 p 4

[Article by Colonel Drovosekov: "When Availability Isn't"]

[Text] In ancient times two con men arrived at a fairytale kingdom. They knew that the local king really liked to dress up and so they passed themselves off as weavers who could weave magical cloth with an exceptionally beautiful design and color and with one surprising property. The cloth was invisible to any person who was out of place or utterly stupid. As Hans Christian Anderson tells us, the king immediately ordered some of this cloth.

The end result is well known. The king was actually naked, but neither high officials or the king himself would allow themselves to admit that they didn't see this magical cloth. Their motives are obvious.

And it is difficult to say what motivated the commission composed of Lieutenant Colonel A. Kalinin, Majors V. Fomin and V. Belodedov and Warrant Officer S. Sipratov, but only this commission saw that which was impossible to see. And it not only saw in general terms, but also in the particulars and testified to these things in a document on 28 August 1981. This document stated that the commission referred to had reviewed the sets of protective clothing then in use and concluded how many were to be downgraded and how many were to be written off as defective.

This improbable document which certified the availability of these suits when they were absolutely not there nearly moved up the chain of command, but stalled at some level and they forgot about it. It was remembered a year later when Captain S. Khitsenko assumed the job of chief of chemical services in the unit. He became interested in the protective clothing which appeared in Warrant Officer S. Sipratov's inventory, but the latter only made a helpless gesture. Tyu-tyu [a sound made in hide-and-go-seek to prompt the "it" person to look], they say. I was finding them to issue, but wasn't able to collect them in time.

Khitsenko demand that this be investigated. This was entrusted to Lieutenant Colonel A. Kalinin whose name is already familiar. He concluded that 60 protective suits were lost through Sipratov's fault and another 11 were lost due to other officers and warrant officers. The unit commander ordered that S. Sipratov pay one-third of his pay, and the other 11 officers pay the full cost of a protective suit.

At first glance this order seems well enough. However under close scrutiny the flaw is obvious. One-third of Warrant Officer Sipratov's pay is insignificant when compared to the cost of 60 protective suits. To eliminate this contradiction, a document signed by Lieutenant Colonel A. Kalinin, Captain S. Khitsenko, Senior Lieutenant S. Lysenko and Warrant Officer V. Yevdokimov came to light. This stated that these 60 protective suits "are not suitable for further use and are subject to be written off." And so that there would be no doubt, the defects were listed in detail. In other words, just as before, the commission saw what was impossible to see. However, a document is a document and based on it, a new document came to life in the unit. Lieutenant Colonel V. Nikitin sent it to the staff of the Moscow Military District in order to write off the ill-fated suits.

It appeared that everything would go smoothly, but it didn't turn out that way. The senior chief made out that what was before him was a fraud. And so that Comrade Nikitin did not feed his illusions, the chief expressed his dissatisfaction in writing.

Lieutenant Colonel Nikitin understood everything and pigeon-holed the unpleasant paper. Meanwhile, the 60 protective suits were considered to be available just as before.

"The issue of the suits must be resolved immediately," said Major N. Stametov who had recently taken over as chief of chemical services. "This is a matter of combat readiness..."

He was right. And not only must the issue of protective clothing be resolved, but also the issue of trailer kitchens. Yes, they are present, but the amount of missing spare parts and instruments is impressive. When and where it all disappeared is a complete mystery. Warrant Officer S. Bystrov could have explained it all, but he was reassigned and had no time to answer questions about kitchens. However, it must be said that not long before his transfer, the kitchens were inspected twice and twice were rated as fully operational.

"No one ever checked the kitchen ZIP spare parts, instruments and accessories," Rear Service Officer Ye. Reznik had to recognize, "and this is the result. But we will make up the losses."

His intentions are good. It is only sad that this intention doesn't spread to material property. Because the difference between the amount in the warehouse and the how much is needed is a rather large amount. District inspectors detected it, but then the local inspector, Lieutenant V. Filin, who had checked the unit's material service two months earlier, drew a line through the "shortages" column. In other words, all equipment was there. The internal review committee chaired by Major V. Yaroshenko and also at that time former chief of the unit's material services, Captain D. Kapustin, reaffirmed it to Filin who had energetically helped.

Is it possible that the chief of the warehouse, Warrant Officer A. Didov, hypnotized all of them and that he had wound them around his little finger? Nothing of the kind. One doesn't need hypnosis there where no one inventories,

where for years documents were written about checks although no one ever checked for anything. Neither reasonable people nor the internal verification commission did. It is no accident that Warrant Officer Didov, who was "resting" in the guardhouse after a voluntary trip through his personal affairs, told me that he premeditatedly reported shortages to no one. He was certain that everything would blow over. He would write off the equipment shortages in a few years and that would be the end. And now the military prosecutors office was interested.

Apparently the help of the military prosecutors office is also needed in another unit where they couldn't find the guilty people in a 2000 ruble loss of furniture.

"As far back as 3 years ago when I took the job and the shortages were detected, I asked that an investigation be made, but it was not done as assigned," said Rear Services Officer N. Kolesnik, "and to try and find the guilty parties now..."

The situation is exactly the same in the unit commanded by ... But wait! Unfortunately there are many facts of this type. One place doesn't have enough sheepskin coats, and another is missing radio receivers, a third-- provisions. And these are shortages that as a rule are detected either by district inspectors or by those taking over the job.

All waste and shortages result from a lack of responsibility and lack of concern for safeguarding socialist property. Moreover some chiefs for many years do not conduct inventories whose scheduling is called for by regulations as they still entrust many thousands of rubles of material at times to people like those swindlers in the fairytale who shouldn't be allowed anywhere near valuables. And no one fears the rogues on the internal review commission. In all the cases described here the commissions ascertained that the equipment was available even when it wasn't. And there is another important matter. All shortages were discovered in warehouses of people who were comparatively recently recommended for jobs with material responsibility. This is the approach to personnel selection and placement.

As we see, reality in some units is close to that seen in the fairytale kingdom, with the difference being that as yet not a single person directly or indirectly guilty of committing the losses has been found. And such a thing could happen without fail if those who do not care about safeguarding military equipment were attired in the same clothes as are on the documents, but that materially do not exist.

12511

CSO: 1801/226

ARMED FORCES

JUDICIAL DECISIONS REFLECT LACK OF UNANIMITY, DISCIPLINE IN UNIT

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83) p 12

[Article by Sr WO (Praporshchik) P. Soloninka, deputy chairman of warrant officers' comrades' court of honor, Red Banner Carpathian Military District: "School of Legal Knowledge: It is Easier to Prevent"]

[Text] "Tell in the journal about the practice of legal propaganda."

From a presentation by Sr WO V. Navtolyan at a readers' conference in the Red Banner Central Asian Military District.

This episode was instructive for me as well as for the other warrant officers. A comrades' court of honor once was looking into the infraction of WO A. Lysykh. Many complaints had accumulated against the driver-instructor for various omissions, and the last incident--drunk while performing duty as the motor pool duty officer--exhausted patience. By a majority of votes the comrades' court pronounced a strict and, I believe, just judgement.

I now recall this court and I cannot get an important detail out of my mind: the judgement was made by a majority of votes, but not unanimously. Why? Because at that time an atmosphere of unanimous moral condemnation of the violator of discipline could not be formed in the collective. As a result some warrant officers were not able to give the driver-instructor's conduct an evaluation of principle.

WO A. Rybka generally tried to convince everyone that it was impossible to give severe punishment to a person who allegedly performed excellently at work all day long. He was backed up by warrant officers A. Krasnoshchekikh and A. Dolgov: "Just think, he had a drink..."

Of course, these people's comments did not play a deciding part in passing judgement, but they force us to ponder. Were we, members of the warrant officers' comrades' court of honor, doing everything to shape and maintain in the collective a unified public opinion and irreconcilability toward violators of discipline, and to prevent future infractions? The fact is that a court of honor is not only a punitive entity, but above all an indoctrinational

element... This means preventive work has to be increased, we have to go into the subunits and perform vigorous legal propaganda.

The party demands this of all of us. The CPSU CC, USSR Council of Ministers and AUCCTU Decree "Intensifying Work to Strengthen Socialist Labor Discipline" states directly that the force of public opinion, Soviet laws, legal indoctrination, and measures of disciplinary influence must be used more fully in the fight against negative phenomena.

But how can this be done in practice? At the advice of the commander as well as the party committee secretary, we gave special attention to those warrant officers who were trying to shield violators of discipline and we performed indoctrinational work with them, relying on the help and support of the military lawyer.

Together with WO V. Padasenko, a member of the comrades' court of honor, and Lt Col Justice S. Gritsko, we visited the subunit where Sr WO A. Dolgov serves as first sergeant. In talking with Capt G. Targayev and with the first sergeants of other batteries, we realized the explanation of Dolgov's attempt to justify WO Lysykh: he himself abused alcohol.

A principled discussion took place with Dolgov, and he heard complaints and criticism not only from us, but also from the other first sergeants. CPSU member WO P. Sverdel told him face to face:

"If you come inebriated once more, you alone are to blame."

These were not just words: Dolgov saw that the party member was supported by all the warrant officers and he had to ponder his own conduct seriously.

Members of the comrades' court also learned how warrant officers Rybka and Krasnoshchekikh were serving. They also were strictly cautioned and reminded that a warrant officer is a regular military person and bears not only moral, but also legal responsibility for his attitude toward official duties. Maj V. Karabanov, a member of the comrades' court of honor, visited WO Krasnoshchekikh at home. He had a talk with the warrant officer's wife and said that if her husband did not value service in the Armed Forces then resolute measures might be taken against him. This helped us in the indoctrinational work.

Someone possibly would think: what does the wife have to do with it? Should a comrades' court turn to the family at all? But I know from experience that the family atmosphere, relationships between the spouses and living conditions represent that very important aspect of life without which there cannot be normal duty. Therefore we members of the comrades' court constantly take an interest in the state of affairs in warrant officer families, delve into the people's needs and try to help resolve problems of finding jobs for wives and getting children into kindergartens and sports sections. We report to the commander and the housing commission if someone has an acute need of improved housing conditions. WO V. Popkov received a three-room apartment with our help.

Over a quarter-century I have learned a simple truth: if the regulation has become law for a serviceman, if he strives to become a master of military affairs and if he is not deprived of a healthy Army ambition, his service follows an ascending path. We have such people in our unit as well, and Sr WO A. Fadeyev is among them. For several years in a row now the platoon he commands has been outstanding. Fadeyev works painstakingly with the privates, delves into their concerns, and he himself is a model of diligence and discipline. We rely on such soldiers in helping the command element prevent infractions of military discipline.

And when a good example or public opinion do not help, we rely on the strength of the law. We also use such effective forms for preventing disciplinary infractions as a talk by a military lawyer or a procurator's warning. For example, that is how we managed to place warrant officers V. Panasyuk and N. Zabrotskiy on the proper path. Members of the comrades' court chatted with them after the first infraction, a military lawyer talked with them after the second, and there was no third infraction: both warrant officers came to their senses, as they say.

We also devote much attention to propaganda work and invite in lawyers to give lectures on military legislation and to hold talks. This is how a unified public opinion about a violator is formed in a collective familiar with the standards of Soviet military law, and no one dares scorn that public opinion.

There is one other very important direction in our preventive work: a unique kind of sponsorship over young warrant officers. Not one of the novices is ignored. We know how they serve and live, and where and how they spend free time. WO V. Danilyuk arrived in the unit a year ago and he was greeted cordially. WO Ye. Zhuk placed his young comrade in the picture, took a constant interest in his duty and helped him overcome the difficulties inevitable at first. The collective soon was augmented with a good specialist and a diligent, disciplined soldier. This was an overall success for our work.

I don't wish to state that we have no problems at all now. Life and duty do not shape up simply for everyone. But cause for surgical intervention, so to speak, is arising more and more rarely for the warrant officers' comrades' court of honor.

We have seen that when a comrades' court of honor along with the command element and the party and Komsomol organizations and with the help of military lawyers performs purposeful preventive work, it is capable of keeping a warrant officer from making a crude mistake. We are fully succeeding in this today.

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ARMED FORCES

ZNAMENOSETS CORRESPONDENT CRITICIZES DISCHARGE PROCEDURE

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83) p 25

[Article by ZNAMENOSETS correspondent Maj A. Kupryashin: "TDY in Response to a Letter: Observe the Law: Into the Reserve for Complaining"]

[Text] Before me is a letter by WO [Praporshchik] N. Makhnovets, which was sent to the editors of ZNAMENOSETS: "I don't know where to seek justice, for I am being released against my will," he writes. And here is the text of an application signed in the very same handwriting: "Request release to the reserve at my own desire in connection with the completion of the term of service..." Which document is to be believed? Where is the truth?

"The letter," responds Nikolay Makhnovets at our meeting, "contains everything that has been painful of late. The desire to serve in the Army never left me, but the request..." He pauses, pondering, then continues with offense in his voice: "You know, when you are told over and over every day: 'write a request, write a request or we will release you so that you will have to pay an additional 500 rubles'... Any person may not hold out."

I listened to him and looked at the strong, calloused hands with which he was stroking the fair-haired little heads of twins clinging to him. A third son stood nearby and looked at us sadly. The reserve warrant officer was not seeking sympathy or pity. He simply was perplexed as to just where he had gone wrong to be released as a person unnecessary to the Army! He requested help in returning to service.

He hadn't had an easy position; he was a TECh [technical maintenance unit] mechanic, and this required attentiveness and self-discipline. He displayed such qualities in work, but once his self-restraint still betrayed him. It happened on the day when he arrived at the airfield in the morning without having slept, tired from looking after a sick child during the night. He arrived in the hope that he would find attention and support here in the collective where he had served several years, but instead of this he heard the standing question: "Why haven't you signed the request for release?" And so he took up the pen at that time.

Just why was the aviation mechanic ill-suited to the TECh? Why didn't the unit command element deem it possible to extend his period of duty?

To look into this I read many documents and talked with many officers and warrant officers, and heard more than once that Makhnovets was a specialist and disciplined mechanic needed by the TECh, and that he had skilled hands. I was shown an enlisted men's teahouse, a hut for the monitoring and testing service and other rooms which Makhnovets had built. People said that he would unreservedly fulfill any instructions of superiors without regard for personal time. He highly valued duty in the unit, and this is understandable. He arrived here as an extended-term junior sergeant and returned here after completing warrant officer school. Here he became a first class specialist. He worked in a sector which was considered almost the most difficult among aviation mechanics, but he coped excellently with his duties.

In his personal file, with which I familiarized myself at the military commissariat, all performance appraisals kept up a friendly tone. By the way, it was emphasized that he is disciplined and that he improves his political and military-technical knowledge. Just why was the conclusion drawn suddenly in the last performance appraisal that it was best to release him for moral and job qualities? The riddle is simply answered, as they say. Makhnovets requested that his large family be assigned an apartment, since it was huddled in a small kitchen of a private home, but the landlords requested them to vacate even this temporary corner. Just where was the family to live if Makhnovets was refused an apartment for various reasons? Official living space could have been assigned to him such as is authorized under existing legislation, but even this was not given to him. The unit command element became "grievously upset" with the warrant officer after a letter went to a higher level requesting help and after the subsequent instruction of the senior commander to assign an apartment.

"You decided to complain? You will have neither an apartment nor the Army." It was after this that the performance appraisal was drawn up containing many statements which, to put it mildly, caused bewilderment.

"During his duty he didn't show himself to be politically competent," wrote Makhnovets' immediate superior, Maj A. Skuridin, in it. And he didn't even take a look at the political training log, where only "fives" and "fours" stand opposite the warrant officer's name. A commission also gave him a good grade in the final inspection.

The officer noted that Makhnovets did not serve as an example in performing official duties, nor did he take part in public life. This is not quite accurate. Of all people, Maj Skuridin should know full well that any work went swimmingly for 1st Class Specialist WO Makhnovets, no matter what he took up. He also played in an amateur brass band.

Just what guided Maj Skuridin in drawing up an appraisal known to be unobjective? I didn't manage to hear a clear-cut answer from him on this question. One thing was clear: the group chief was trying to conceal the true reason for the warrant officer's release from the Army, which is that the warrant officer's repeated requests for assistance pestered the TECh administration. They decided to get rid of him by forcing him to sign the request for release, and

so the mechanic became "unnecessary to the Army" although Maj Skuridin admitted that the subunit is feeling a clear lack of aviation specialists and Makhnovets worked better than many others.

Sr Lt S. Gerasimov, a technician of the aircraft and engines group, added that if everyone worked as Makhnovets did, they would fulfill the norm by a full 200 percent. Warrant officers S. Kravchenko and M. Boyko, whose opinions are authoritative in the TECh, were very much surprised on hearing what was in the performance appraisal.

"He was a conscientious, responsible specialist," they declared as one. "It is a pity that he is not next to us now; one always can rely on such a mechanic."

Sergey Mikhaylovich Kravchenko, a master of military affairs who has served 25 years in the Army, does not conceal the fact that Nikolay has a complicated character and that in recent months he was at times quick-tempered and absent-minded because of living problems and conflicts with supervisors. Because of this he made a technical error and received a reprimand, the only one in all his six years of service.

As a matter of fact, it is difficult to preserve self-control when one is driven from emotional balance day in and day out by being made to understand that there is no place in the unit for a "complainer." Anyone probably would give up, but nevertheless, WO Makhnovets believed in justice to the last day and would try to work well on arriving at the airfield, until once he was called to headquarters and handed a release form without being looked in the eyes. He didn't even hear a "thanks for your work" from anyone. Everything good he had done had been firmly forgotten and all his six years of conscientious work was cancelled by the unobjective and biased performance appraisal, which pursued just one goal: to annoy the person as much as possible and to release him from the Army so that others henceforth would refrain from complaining.

By the way, the conclusion about WO Makhnovets' unsuitability for further duty was signed by Officer V. Zakharov, who didn't conceal the fact that he didn't really know this mechanic and hadn't talked to him prior to his release to the reserve.

"I know well the malicious violators of military discipline such as alcoholics warrant officers Zverkovskiy, Tkachev and others, but I have difficulty saying anything about Makhnovets," admitted Vladimir Danilovich.

It wasn't difficult to be convinced that some warrant officers in the regiment clearly didn't value their rank. Negligence, failure to report to duty and addiction to alcohol--all this hardly elevates their authority, but it allows them to remain in the Army. On the other hand, they quickly settled with Makhnovets, who dared complain to the senior commander. They decided the fate of a person without hearing him out or looking him in the eye, as they say. But the documents which regulate the procedure for performance of military duty by warrant officers clearly state that each instance of release must be

preceded by a thorough, objective check and the commander's personal talk with the subordinates. In this case no such work was performed.

All this leads us to the thought that the unit doesn't attach proper importance to work with this category of servicemen. It is simpler to release a warrant officer to the reserve and request a new specialist in his place, people here believe, than to conduct purposeful indoctrinational work with him and show concern for satisfying his lawful needs.

Yes, it is apparent from everything that people were hasty with the decision about releasing WO Makhnovets to the reserve. A disappointing mistake occurred, but some appointed persons are kept from admitting it by an absence of self-criticism.

V. Burennikov, an officer of the personnel agency whom I told the results of my TDY, promised to make a trip to the unit urgently and thoroughly look into what happened in order to restore justice. After some time I got in touch with him by phone.

"Vladislav Petrovich, what was your conclusion?"

"The decision about WO Makhnovets' release to the reserve was made properly, and his request exists," responded the lieutenant colonel.

"And did you talk with Makhnovets himself?"

"No..."

These are strange work methods, in our view. One writes, frankly speaking, a false performance appraisal and another signs an application for the warrant officer's release from the Army without having talked with that person. A third goes to look into matters and doesn't even deem it necessary to meet with the reserve warrant officer and hear him out. What is this? Indifference toward a person's fate and callousness, or official arrogance? It is obviously both. What there is not is a principled, party style in working with cadres.

The June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum emphasized that more concern must be shown for people and there must be a resolute fight against the indifference typical of some administrative workers. That is the party's demand, and it is set forth in all party and state documents. No one is permitted to forget about this demand.

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ARMED FORCES

LETTERS TO ZNAMENOSETS EDITOR, RESPONSES

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83)
pp 30-31

[Series of individual responses or letters: "Reader-Journal-Reader: In the Wake of ZNAMENOSETS Articles"]

[Excerpts] Once More About the "Responsible Parties"

The article entitled "Beneath the Stamp of Initiative" and published in the journal's sixth issue this year condemned the practice of regular appointment of so-called responsible parties. The responses to this article which have been received indicate that some units and subunits continue to attempt to maintain internal order and strengthen military discipline by such nonregulation methods.

This is stated in particular in a letter whose author wished to remain anonymous out of fear of being pressured for criticism. There are grounds for this, in his words: the example of colleague R. Arevyan, who tried to show the illegality of appointing responsible parties, but made things unpleasant for himself. Since then the only change in the unit has been that the "responsible party" has been renamed as a "controller" and a corresponding document was published, a copy of which was appended to the letter.

The list of duties of the responsible party, that is to say, the controller, is set forth in three sections of the document which in number of points surpasses the duties of regimental commander written in the regulation. The controller must keep absolutely everything occurring in the subunit under unremitting supervision, and specifically (we quote only selected excerpts): reveille, quality of work by clean-up personnel, messing procedure, company formation and movement, preparation of the oncoming daily detail, substantiation for assigning crews to fatigue details, and so on. The controller has to delve into any small detail right down to checking "whether or not doors to the weapon storage room, storeroom and company office are sealed and whether or not the lights have been turned out in all subsidiary spaces."

In taking this document as a guide to action, the controller is obligated to spend an entire 24-hour period in the barracks "without absenting himself

from the subunit without authorization." The fact is that the appointed officer or warrant officer also has immediate official duties determined by the regulation. As a result, the job for which he is personally responsible suffers.

This thought is persistently seen in readers' letters. It is not the additional difficulties that frighten them, as some supervisors believe who try to shift personal responsibility for the status of internal order to someone, but the fact that one can't impose order by nonregulation measures.

"Have 'excess' officers and warrant officers really appeared if they are being assigned to duplicate NCO duties?" is the reasonable question asked by WO [Praporshchik] I. Kulesh. A group of warrant officers--Stepanov, Borodulin, Moiseyenko, Veretennikov and others--write about this as a sore subject: "We actually are replacing junior commanders and are losing our authority, and we are being taken from the performance of our immediate duties."

The letters which have been sent report a rather unique reaction by some administrators to the appearance of the journal's critical article on initiatives of doubtful value. "If they don't like the word 'responsible party,' we'll replace it with 'guarantor'," is apparently what was decided in the unit where WO [Michman] Yu. Ryabov serves. The responsible party also was given a new name in the unit from which the aforementioned collective letter arrived. Now he is given the high-sounding title "duty officer for monitoring the order of the day." It is true that the functions being performed are the previous ones, very similar to those listed in the aforementioned "controller's duties."

In the unit where Gds Maj Kudryavtsev is acting chief of staff it was believed that one responsible party in each subunit was insignificant and clearly insufficient. Therefore, a "control group" of two persons headed by an officer from unit headquarters was additionally made part of the detail. The staff also made up an appropriate instruction which obligates them to "monitor," "keep a record," "receive reports"...

The editors familiarized Maj Gen V. Yermín, chief of one of the directorates of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, with responses coming in to the article entitled "Beneath the Stamp of Initiative." In an official response to the editors he announced:

"The USSR Armed Forces Combined-Arms Regulations were approved by Ukase of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and so their demands are the law and must be followed strictly by every serviceman regardless of his position.

"The regulations stipulate that the commander of a subunit, unit or ship and all other immediate superiors are directly responsible for maintaining firm internal order and strengthening conscious military discipline.

"The assignment of so-called 'responsible' officers and warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] in units and subunits contradicts demands of the

Combined-Arms Regulations, undermines one-man command and degrades the responsibility of commanders as well as appointed persons of the daily detail for daily maintenance of regulation order and for strengthening military discipline.

"Such a practice by some commanders indicates their inability to organize the personnel's life and routine strictly by the regulations and cannot be justified."

No comment is necessary, as they say, on such a clear statement.

"Nine Months of Silence"

That was the title of an article published in the journal's July 1983 issue which discussed red tape connected with paying WO [Praporshchik] P. Stolyarenko the difference in salaries for temporary performance of an officer's duty.

As the editors were told by political officer Col V. Kononenko, this item was discussed in the political department of Unit "X." A check of facts showed that all payments had been made to the warrant officer and that the infraction mentioned had been made in the absence of the chief of the unit finance agency where the letter's author serves, by an inexperienced finance worker.

Because of the red tape and indifferent attitude to subordinates' wants and needs, Officer A. Dorofeyev was instructed on the inadmissibility of such facts in the future. The chief of the unit finance also was given a strict warning for poor supervision over staff and finance discipline.

For some reason the response from the political agency did not give the names of financial workers guilty of the red tape.

An Inspired Mood

I read the article by WO [Praporshchik] V. Korabel'shchikov entitled "Company Talents" in the eighth issue of ZNAMENOSETS and recalled my years as a private and my participation in amateur performances.

Of course we too lacked time for rehearsals. We would rehearse in free minutes and on days off. But when we succeeded in performing well and if people liked our performance, then we felt bright and happy.

Amateur work does not mean just the uncovering of talent, as the article states correctly; it is also the self-assertion of an individual and access to the world of music and the world of the stage. For me, participation in the subunit's amateur activities became a stepping-stone to real music: I entered the choir-master correspondence-course department of the Chimkent School of Music.

On one New Year's Eve TECh [technical maintenance unit] political deputy Capt S. Kuznetsov and I dropped in on the subunit. Capt Kuznetsov also had performed earlier. We performed several lyrical songs together--I played the accordion and he sang. You should have seen how the soldiers were surprised and pleased at our performance! How their mood rose! We gave the soldiers the gift of song and music that New Year's Eve.

The soldiers took up the idea that anyone who could do it would perform certain pieces in the barracks on holidays. No, it was not for the purpose of ending up at the district review, but creating a holiday mood for their comrades in service.

I will note that evenings are much more lively and the repertoire is richer if not only the soldiers participate in amateur performances, but also members of servicemen's families. If there is an opportunity to unify one's own amateur performances with those of a sponsor, joint concerts make soldiers' leisure time even more interesting and meaningful. I pity those subunit commanders and first sergeants and the party and Komsomol activists who ignore this important aspect of subunits' cultural life and underestimate its enormous effect on the personnel's indoctrination. The spark of amateur activities discussed by WO V. Korabel'shchikov embellishes a soldier's service, elevates the people's morale and helps in combat training.

Sr WO K. Mikhurov
Red Banner Central Asian Military
District

Editorial Reply: Not Recommended for Promotion

The letter by WO [Praporshchik] R. Dotsenko caused editorial workers to delve into the substance of his request and provide necessary assistance. He announced that he had been serving faultlessly and the subunit was in first place in socialist competition. The position he holds was contained in the appropriate List, but for reasons which could not be understood the title of "Senior Warrant Officer" was not conferred on him.

Of course, the thought was that there had been a misunderstanding and it would be simple to remedy. The editors sent this letter to the personnel directorate of the Red Banner Kiev Military District with a request to look into the reasons and resolve the matter as quickly as possible.

Then an answer signed by Comrade Svirin was received, which stated that WO Dotsenko was committing serious omissions in service and behavior and then listed the disciplinary punishments which still have not been removed. There is a total of five. That is why Comrade Dotsenko has not been recommended for the military rank of "Senior Warrant Officer."

And so this is the reason for the delay with conferring the new rank, but why doesn't WO Dotsenko understand this?

Although a Letter was not Written: Indifferent Attitude

WO (Res) A. Pitirimov complained to the editors that some two months had gone by since his release from the Armed Forces but his personal file had not arrived in the rayon military commissariat at his place of permanent residence. Because of this he could not receive documents and become officially registered for work. The unit also had not given him military travel documents for the trip to his new place of residence and so he had to travel at his own expense.

The commander of the unit where the warrant officer served informed the editors that an extract from the order excluding WO Pitirimov from the personnel rolls was sent promptly to a higher echelon for inclusion in the personal file, and from there it had been sent to the Frunzenskiy Rayon military commissariat in the city of Ivanovo. Soviet Army employee M. Pavlova, inspector for personnel training, was given a strict reprimand for the delay in dispatch (a month later). Soviet Army employee A. Lozitskaya, chief bookkeeper of the unit, was reprimanded for not issuing travel documents to a warrant officer being released to the reserve. These comrades also were deprived of bonuses for the second quarter of 1983.

The command element discussed with bookkeeping and staff workers the inadmissibility of such instances in the future.

Deficiency Removed

ZNAMENOSETS received a letter from Sr Sgt of Extended Service A. Shumov concerning the correctness of a monetary deficit charged to him, amounting to three months' salary. The letter was sent to the military procurator of the Red Banner Kiev Military District, on whose assignment Col Justice F. Kruchinin, military procurator of the Chernigov Garrison, responded. A check of this statement was made and the order holding serviceman Shumov materially liable was protested as having been issued in violation of the law. The commander who issued this order rescinded it. Lt Col Justice Krylov, the deputy military procurator who had supervision over Comrade Shumov's letter, was given strict instructions for the delay in responding to the editors about resolving the matter.

And He Himself is Guilty

"For nine months I have not been provided with clothing," WO [Praporshchik] N. Sidorov reported to the editors.

Lt Col S. Karakis, acting chief of clothing service of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, informed the editors in response to our request that at the present time the author of the letter has been fully provided with clothing. A check also showed that the serviceman previously had served in the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, and that 2½ months had gone by from the time of his release until he was again accepted for military duty. According to the existing statute, with an interruption in service of no more

than three months the issue of clothing is made at the expiration of service life of articles of uniform previously received.

WO Sidorov concealed the fact that he received property on being released to the reserve, and there was no individual clothing and equipment record in his personal file. The persons at fault for this are the clothing service chief of the unit where the warrant officer previously was on the rolls, who hadn't signed the individual clothing and equipment record, and Maj Semin, the clothing service chief of the unit at Comrade Sidorov's new duty station, who had not requested the document promptly. Officer Semin was given strict instructions.

You Ask and We Answer

To Warrant Officers [Praporshchiki] S. Veshayev and S. Makarov.

You inquire about how initial officer ranks are conferred on warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany].

As it was explained to us in the Ministry of Defense Main Personnel Directorate, initial officer ranks are conferred on warrant officers with consideration of their age (they must not be over 27 years of age) and the presence of a requirement for officers in that specialty. A candidate for receiving an officer rank must have a higher or secondary education, must pass a secondary military school as an external student or must complete a higher or secondary specialized civilian educational institution in the profile related to the military specialty. Another mandatory condition is successful performance of duties in the officer position.

All questions of conferring an officer rank are decided at the duty station through immediate superiors and personnel agencies.

To WO [Praporshchik] V. Pavlov.

Your letter on the question of receiving traveling expenses was examined by the finance service of the Red Banner Turkestan Military District, to which the editors turned. It explained that according to the existing statute on monetary allowances for Soviet Army and Navy personnel, traveling expenses are paid to officers and warrant officers with assignments to positions involving an actual trip from one populated point to another to permanent quarters of a military unit or subunit for a distance of more than 25 km and with a change in residence. You, however, were transferred to a military unit located at that point where you were serving before the appointment, and then you left for a subunit of this unit. Therefore you were not authorized traveling expenses. In this case only the actual expenses for your trip and for members of your family can be reimbursed, but no more than the amount of traveling expenses authorized for a trip of up to 100 km, i.e., for you personally no more than a half-month's pay and for each member of your family no more than one-fourth of a month's pay due you by the day of the family's arrival.

To Enlisted Woman N. Zadorozhnaya.

You asked about payment of compensation in place of footwear not in your size.

The clothing service of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District explained that in accordance with the existing statute, women accepted on a voluntary basis for active military service in the position of private, sergeant and petty officer are provided with footwear under the allowances established for them. There is no monetary compensation. In exceptional cases, where certain servicemen of the categories mentioned above require certain articles in sizes not at the depots, individual footwear is sewn in the military exchange establishments and shops by authorization of the district clothing service. Only the military district clothing service pays for its manufacture based on existing price handbooks.

To WO [Michman] A. Kazakh and Warrant Officers [Praporshchiki] V. Pilipchuk, B. Dudka and F. Dolgoplov.

You ask us to explain what reasons can be considered valid for the transfer of warrant officers [praporshchiki and michmany] from one unit to another at the end of the regular term of sign-up.

The transfer of warrant officers from one unit to another is done only in the presence of one of the following reasons:

If a military medical commission finds that a serviceman's performance of duties in a given area or the presence of members of his family there is contraindicated. If in performing the necessary check the military commissariat at the parents' place of residence finds that the assistance of an only son is required to care for the parents because of their state of health. And if there are no appropriate vacant positions in connection with organizational measures which have been taken at a warrant officer's place of duty.

It must be borne in mind that a change in a military unit's location cannot serve as the basis for transfer to another unit.

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ARMED FORCES

READERS COMPLAIN OF MILITARY FOUL-UPS

Moscow ZNAMENOSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83) p 24

[Article by Col A. Kiryukhin: "Reflections on Letters: Clearing the Air..."]

[Text] To begin with, let's summarize the substance of three complaints to the editors.

WO [Praporshchik] T. Pirverdiyev from the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District reported that in March of this year it was forgotten to include him in the list of soldiers who successfully passed tests for confirming a class rating, through the fault of responsible persons (one would like to write: "irresponsible"). As a result the warrant officer was deprived of the title of master.

WO M. Asadchiy sent a letter from the Red Banner Belorussian Military District, saying that he has served a long while and, according to commanders' comments, he has served conscientiously. For some unknown reason, however, there has been a delay in conferring the rank of "senior warrant officer." His colleagues warrant officers I. Lyul'ko and G. Sapega are in the very same position.

And finally, WO (Res) M. Misechko presented a very unhappy story in his letter. He served for 10 years in one of the units of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District and was forced to leave the Army because of family circumstances. He departed for his home in the city of Rovno. He had no housing and he moved into a hotel with a family of four. He went to the military commissariat to register and receive a record of service, but there he was "gladdened" with the news that there was no personal file and he had to wait. And so he went to the military commissariat for a long while. His savings were coming to an end and he couldn't get a job since he hadn't been given a record of service because of the absence of a personal file, and without the record the militia agencies would not make out a passport or arrange even a temporary registration. The family was deprived of medical assistance. The beginning of the school year was approaching and it was time to place the older daughter in first grade, but the school also demanded a registration.

There are three stories which at first glance have nothing in common among themselves, but this is only at first glance. They do have something in common, and we soon will be convinced of this.

In an attempt to help the journal's readers, the editors sent the complaints without delay to the commanders and chiefs competent to resolve the problems in question with a request to examine them within the time period set by law.

It must be admitted that all three addressees responded rather promptly. Lt Col V. Skoryatin from the ZakVO [Transcaucasus Military District] announced that the class rating of "master" had been preserved for WO Pirverdiyev until the next confirmation. A report came from Col V. Sheykin from the personnel directorate of the very same district that the personal file of WO (Res) Misechko had been sent to the Rovno Oblast military commissariat. Comforting news also arrived from Comrade V. Vakar from the BVO [Belorussian Military District] that the military rank of "senior warrant officer" had been conferred on warrant officers Asadchiy, Lyul'ko and Sapega.

It would appear that justice triumphed in all three cases and that we can finish the stories we have told with a sigh of relief. But it would appear too early to do this, and here is why.

One and the same questions varied in one form or another in all warrant officer complaints received by the editors: who is guilty? Who trampled on their lawful rights for a long while? Why can't the requests be resolved locally? These questions can be answered briefly with complete confidence that of course the guilty parties are those appointed persons in the units who take an unconscientious attitude toward fulfilling their official duties and who give rise to red tape and confusion in matters.

Take the incident with WO Pirverdiyev. The fact is that before writing to the editors he reported the mistake which had been made through channels but the guilty parties did not hasten to straighten out. It took four months and a letter from Moscow to satisfy the serviceman's lawful demands.

And take the ill-fated story about WO (Res) Misechko's personal file! As he writes, he was released from the Army on 1 May of this year, but his personal file was sent from the unit only on 20 June despite repeated requests. It took a staff worker a month and 20 days to place the documents in a package and send them to the military commissariat. What is this if not the most genuine red tape?

Comrade V. Vakar correctly admits in the response sent to the editors that WO Asadchiy and his colleagues could not receive the military rank of "senior warrant officer" for a long while due to red tape in the work of appointed persons.

The reason for the appearance of these complaints (and not just these complaints, but many others) is the bureaucratic work style of a number of servicemen on staffs and in personnel agencies. Everyone agrees with this,

red-tapists and bureaucrats are criticized at meetings, satirical articles are written about them and complaints about them go to senior chiefs, political entities and press organs. It would appear that they should have changed the work style condemned by the June 1983 CPSU CC Plenum long ago, but far from it! Many of the bureaucrats do not even think of turning over a new leaf.

The natural question arises: why does this happen. It is apparently because some appointed persons and political agencies look through the fingers at violations of the prescribed procedure of working with documents, complaints and petitions of servicemen. Some managers do not consider bureaucratism and the indifference of appointed persons as a great sin at all. Isn't this why, instead of calling things by their own name they delicately call the most deep-rooted red tape "late dispatch of a personal file," or even shield the bureaucrats openly.

For example, in admitting that the "fact actually occurred" (the fact that an appointed person forgot to include WO Pirverdinov in the list), Officer M. Skoryatin did not even deem it necessary to point out through whose blame it "occurred" and whether or not any measures at all were taken toward the guilty party. Comrade Vakar and Sheykin talked their way out of it: the guilty parties were given disciplinary punishment (again without giving names, positions or measures of punishment).

You see just how much some people don't want to give the names of the red-tapists. It is to no purpose; bureaucrats must be brought into the open for a general review and also (and this would be out of justice) the material harm done to the victims should be made up for at their expense. Then they would be certain to rapidly rid themselves of the bacillus of bureaucratism with which, judging from everything, they are infected.

I would like to hope that in this instance the guilty parties actually were punished even though they weren't mentioned by name in the official responses. It does happen that the editors are told that the facts were confirmed and measures taken, but later it turns out that measures were not taken and no one identified or punished the guilty parties. This is a very bad example of encouragement of red-tapists: don't be afraid, continue in the same spirit!

No less important than punishment of a specific culprit is the search for reasons for some appointed persons having the disease of bureaucratism (and there still are many of these, judging from the mail) and the taking of steps to eliminate the causes. It is only by rendering an accurate diagnosis that an illness can be combated successfully. Unfortunately there is not even a word in one of the three answers from the local areas about steps being taken to block the manifestations of bureaucratism and indifference toward people.

In this regard it would not appear to be superfluous to give more reminders to certain "forgetful" comrades about demands of the CPSU working with letters and complaints, as well as directions of the Ministry of

defense on this score and demands of guidance documents, particularly the following: "Provide detailed, justified answers to all questions set forth by the authors of letters monitored by party, soviet and other agencies by editors of newspapers and journals, and by higher commanders and chiefs." To this can be added: and don't send responses smacking of the most commonplace answers written for form only.

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6904

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

SIMULATOR TRAINING FOR AIRBORNE TROOPS DESCRIBED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Goryachev, parachute instructor: "Before Every Jump"]

Text The N Guards Paratroop Regiment, commanded by Guards Major M. Varentsev, is the initiator of socialist competition in the airborne troops. Some of the points of paratroopers' obligations include: further improvement of personnel specialty training, reduction of the period for preparing people and combat equipment for airborne assault and skillful conduct of combat operations after landing in the "enemy's" rear.

This report deals with how things are going in the regiment and, in particular, how the training base of the airborne complex is used for improving ground training of paratroopers.

The tall An-12 mock-up was swaying slightly in the wind. The paratroopers were formed up in double-file the length of the cabin. The command "Jump!", and the soldiers pushed off from the metal threshold. The roller suspensions, to which the parachute harness system is attached, began to run down the inclined monorail, drowning out the commands.

...They are training on the airborne complex simulator. The aircraft cabin, elevated 10 meters high on metal posts, is unusually bare. The paratroopers are without parachutes, helmets and other equipment. And at first glance their tasks looks simple: practice actions during aircraft landing, in stationing people in the cabin, upon separation from the aircraft and landing.

Guards Private S. Fedyunin's turn comes. The paratrooper gets ready, legs together and in a semi-crouch. On the command of the jumpmaster, Guards Senior Lieutenant A. Belichenko, he "jumps."

"An excellent landing," comments Guards Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Babykin, chief instructor and deputy regimental commander for airborne training, "but you need to push off more sharply from the aircraft threshold. Repeat the drill...."

While the platoon commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Belichenko practices jumping from the mock-up aircraft, the remaining platoons of the company commanded by Guards Senior Lieutenant Yu. Prikhod'ko are busy on other equipment of the airborne complex: on the rotating swings, spring boards, the Rhine wheel....

A paratrooper's journey to the skies begins on the ground with the airborne complex simulators, consisting of an entire system of training devices and special platforms, parachute classrooms, facilities for packing multi-canopy rigging and for tying down combat equipment, mock-ups of various types of airplanes, airborne training gantries, rotating swings, parachute jump towers.... There are over 20 different simulators in all.... And a paratrooper must go through each of them, pass tests and only then is the path to the skies open to him. Also, complete training exercises on the airborne complex equipment are conducted before every parachute jump by every paratrooper (soldier and officer), regardless of his experience and number of jumps he has made from aircraft.

The training of a soldier of the airborne guards starts with fostering in him a love for the airborne troops, pride in their heroic combat history and in the regiment's traditions.

They are the glory of the regiment. You see, it is part of the renowned airborne division which blazed a great path over the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. The date 22 June 1944 is entered in gold letters in the combat chronicle. On this day at the Karelian Front, during the assault crossing of the Svir' River, 12 Komsomol-paratroopers from the battalion commanded by Guards Major V. Matokhin displayed courage and heroism, having crossed the water obstacle under heavy fire. The Hitlerites took the daredevils, who pushed in front of themselves rafts with mock-ups of people and weapons, to be forward units starting the water obstacle crossing. They pelted them with heavy artillery fire. But this was a false crossing. The actual massive crossing of our troops was taking place at that time 3 kilometers to the right. So they managed to outwit the enemy. All 12 guardsmen were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union for exhibited bravery and courage.

The paratroopers have distinguished themselves in many exercises during the post-war period. During the past training year they completely met their commitments and the regiment became the best in the formation (soyedineniye).

Before the new training year the personnel outlined high advances in the competition under the motto "Be on the alert, in constant readiness to defend the achievements of socialism!" The guardsmen have committed themselves to earn the title of top regiment and to achieve a high coordination of sub-units and their readiness for carrying out missions under the complex conditions of modern combat.

The first weeks of combat training have shown: the words of the paratroopers of the initiator-regiment do not differ from their deeds. All exercises are held with high effectiveness and quality. The training drills on the

airborne complex simulators are also conducted with great efficiency. The high effectiveness of the training periods is achieved thanks to the fact that each simulator works at full load and that during the training the officers do not act as observers, as is the case at times, but practically set the standards. The airborne training periods are distinguished by the high heat of competition.

Every officer has a special handbook in which not only the number of jumps completed are recorded, but also the results of passed examinations in airborne training. This makes it possible to check the achieved results with the commitments made for this basic discipline in time to take measures if someone begins to show he is falling behind.

Most of the regiment's subunits are noted for their high results. But the subordinates of Guards Senior Lieutenant Prikhod'ko achieve especially great successes in the training periods on the airborne complex. This company's paratroopers are hard to match in parachute packing, tying down combat equipment and in training on the rotating swing, the Rhine wheel and other devices.

The drills on the airborne complex simulators are coming to an end. Now, the platoon headed by Guards Senior Lieutenant Belichenko is working on the Rhine wheel. An officer is "spinning" on the device. Twenty revolutions to the right and twenty to the left.

Ground--sky, ground--sky. The Rhine wheel spins increasingly faster, demanding instantaneous reaction and strength from Belichenko.... Such is the method for developing those qualities without which a parachute jump is unthinkable.

After each soldier in the platoon has "passed" through the Rhine wheel, there is a detailed critique of the exercise. With this the pre-jump training in the company will come to an end. Tomorrow new tasks await the paratroopers--tomorrow are the parachute jumps from an airplane.

12567

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NAVAL FORCES

SHIP LAYOVERS CREATE SPECIAL COMMAND REQUIREMENTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jan 84 p 2

[Article by Capt 1st Rank N. Trofimov: "A Ship Under Repair: Efficiency and a Creative Approach"]

[Text] A ship has arrived for repair. Even an inexperienced eye can see how many miles its stern has left behind and how many storms it has endured. Several of the handrail barrier stanchions are bent, and spots of red lead are showing where the waves have licked the paint from the sides. The skill acquired on the oceans is also sensed in the actions of the sailors who are taking the mooring lines to the plant berthing quay. They are taking them not for one day, but for a long time. Such is the logic of life aboard a ship--the time period set for voyages has elapsed, so you stop for repairs. A complicated and unusual period in the crew's life is beginning.

The superstructures and masts are being covered with construction timbers, the daily routine is changing in conformity with the new conditions, and it becomes more difficult to maintain the usual model order in the quarters and on deck. Even the sailors themselves, side by side with their political and combat training, are now forced to work at unusual matters, helping with the work of the plant specialists. For the ship's commander, repairs are a touchstone on which to test his skill as an organizer. The commander must not only achieve a complete renewal of the operational characteristics of the systems and machinery for which the ship has come to the plant, but also structure the activity of his subordinates so that they do not lose the skills and knowledge acquired on cruises.

However, in practice it happens that after leaving the plant, some of the ship's specialists do not feel entirely confident about their assignments. Of course, the lack of practice necessary to the sailors in servicing operational machinery at sea cannot but have an adverse effect on their mastery. But different crews return to their bases with differing levels of combat readiness from similar or the same periods and conditions of ship repair. Here we intend to examine the costs of that attitude which is accurately nicknamed "repair psychology" in the navy. An example will make clear what this means.

The ship in which Engr-Capt 3rd Rank V. Frolov serves as commander of the electromechanical unit was known for the high level of training and professional mastery of its sailors. The lifespan of much of the machinery was virtually exhausted, but it was always maintained in correct order. When the decision was made to send the ship for repairs, plant representatives came on board to determine the extent of the impending work beforehand.

Some time later, the ship was tied up at the factory mooring. The workers and engineers who had been aboard it quite recently did not believe their eyes. The combat posts had lost their previous appearance, and the parameters of some assemblies that had been in good shape were not up to standard. A conflict situation had arisen. A corresponding correction of plans and claims and a redistribution of resources were required.

It turned out that, knowing of the impending repairs, they had lowered the requirements for maintaining the machinery, and had begun to regard individual violations of instructions and directions tolerantly.

However, after this, difficulties were waiting not just for the ship repairs. The indulgences received by some of the ship's specialists in servicing the machinery in their charge called forth from the sailors a dampening of their enthusiasm and a desire to work negligently. This also soon found expression in the attitude of individual crew members, who previously had distinguished themselves by their performances, toward their other service duties.

At times, one must confront the opinion that losses in sailors' interest in the crew's training are the result of the very fact of sending the ship for repairs, and that it is impossible to seriously organize the study of a specialty under plant conditions. Part of the instruments and machinery is dismantled, part is deactivated and not functioning. Moreover, the constant distractions of the personnel in performing various work, increased in comparison with the usual number of duties, and the presence on board of a large number of engineers and workers--all this does not contribute to the regular training process. In this there is a portion of truth; the difficulties in repairs are great. But the possibilities are also great.

In confirmation, I will cite as an example the unit in which Capt 2nd Rank G. Zhitskiy serves as chief of staff.

Usually several ships are tied up at the plant berthing quay. Aboard some, work is in full swing, while aboard others it is approaching its end. At the direction of Capt 2nd Rank Zhitskiy, the flagship specialists compile a schedule of studies for each specialty in such a way that, let us say, all gunners, miners, or signalmen assemble on those ships where the corresponding machinery either has already been repaired or is awaiting its turn. In this way, the opportunity appears of regularly being trained in its operation. The arrangement is only for the sake of effective operational use.

The same thing happens with apprentices aboard ships at sea. The commander receives a telephone message from the higher staff with instructions to detail a certain number of specialists for practice. And without particularly troubling himself with an analysis of the training of each of his subordinates, he sends on cruise the first men who come to hand or those who at that moment are least necessary for ensuring the plant work. It happens that in such fashion among the apprentices time after time the same ones are sent, and others do not put to sea for months.

A businesslike attitude toward repairs is also manifested in the establishment of strong work contacts between the sailors and representatives of the enterprise. At one of them a ship is being repaired aboard which the officer A. Tsedik serves. The commander of this ship resolves all production difficulties that arise with the competence and initiative inherent to him.

But the opposite also happens. More than once I have had occasion to listen to complaints from engineers and workers that, say, some crew, upon arriving at the plant, regards its task as almost done, and if it even responds to the requests of the ship repair enterprise representatives, does so very unwillingly.

Such was the case, for instance, aboard the ship in which Engr-Capt Lt V. Vdovkin serves. At a very tense moment, when the ship was being prepared for release and work aboard it was in full swing, among the crew it was suddenly decided to hold political briefings in the barracks. Valuable time was lost in moving back and forth, and the workers, who needed the crew's assistance, were placed in a difficult situation. The repair schedule was placed in jeopardy. But the ship's commander stubbornly refused to meet the repairmen's requests. Moreover, there was a completely suitable place for studies next to the berthing quay.

A crew's attitude during repairs depends in large degree upon the unit's headquarters and political section. For example, the displacement of specialists aboard ships tied up at the plant often depends upon them. It is clear that it is impossible to avoid such displacements, that there is no need to do so, and that one must reckon with life's demands. But often the hand that signs the transfer orders is not moved by this. Without question, a ship that is coming back from a cruise is somewhat less responsible than one that is getting ready to put to sea. The temptation arises to rid oneself of those with whom one has had much trouble, for instance, of undisciplined sailors. And they are transferred to a ship undergoing repairs. For their places are chosen the better specialists, who determined the face of the crew and were its pride.

Well, what can a commander do in such situations? How can he keep his crew at its previously high level of morale? Often the answers to these questions are not immediately found, and a crew that will not soon reach its former level of combat mastery returns to the base from the plant. When the sense of a measure is observed in questions of this sort, the ship's personnel

conducts repairs in a stabilized complement, things go better. The crew stays on the repairs, and the crew puts to sea more quickly.

In this respect, one should remember something more. As has already been said, the better and most farsighted officers often try not to believe in plant conditions, or not to be sent there at all. And this is also understandable: the fundamental proving ground for the young officer's experience is not the berthing quay, but long sea and shore duty. And this experience is sometimes obtained in truncated fashion, so that it happens that officers already in solid positions and ranks are for the first time with the complexities and specifics of repairs. They must make up for a lack of knowledge of simple truths. They must make up for the lack of others experienced in their years as lieutenants.

...A ship has arrived for repair. The navy is waiting for its strength to be renewed and restored. But how will the crew leave the plant? Will its first miles after a long anchorage be marked by accuracy and speed? Or will time pass before it becomes fused and united? This will depend upon the crew's attitude during repairs.

12462

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NAVAL FORCES

SUBMARINE TRAINING EXERCISE CONDUCTED IN COASTAL WATERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 26 Jan 84 p 1

[Article by Captain 3d Rank I. Smirnov, Red Banner Pacific Fleet: "Single Combat"]

[Text] The "enemy" proved to be strong-willed. Realizing that the anti-submariners had detected him, he abruptly changed his course and depth.

Captain 3d Rank V. Savosik sized up the tactical move of the submarine commander, whose role for the training exercise was being played by the unit chief of staff, but took his time in making a decision. In such a situation one must act with certainty, otherwise you could end up as a target for the submariners.

Having received the reports of the ship's antisubmarine (ASW) crew members, the captain 3d rank again bent over the map of the exercise area. Off the port side of the ship it is not very deep--the submarine would not go there. To the starboard side, according to the exercise director's plan, other ASW ships were maneuvering--it would be risky for the "enemy" to be there also. So, one must explore the depths straight ahead as carefully as possible.

The patrol-ship creeps ahead at a slow pace. There is a watchful calm at the battle stations. Concentrated faces, measured movements and short-spoken commands.

The watch officer, Senior Lieutenant V. Pesterev brushes away beads of sweat from his forehead--it is hot. The ship's captain encourages the young officer that everything, he says, is normal.

Captain 3d Rank Savosik automatically recalls the duel with the "enemy" submarine at the end of the past training year. The ASW crew earned the praise of the senior commander. They were then called experts at their jobs. There was one source of the expertise: intensive training exercises, most closely approximating real combat conditions.

Speaking of that, not all subunit (podrazdeleniya) commanders trained their subordinates with the proper diligence from the very beginning in the coastal waters, believing that the sailors will sense their power over the

equipment and weapons in full measure only after they work directly on the seas. In particular, the commander of the mine-torpedo unit Senior Lieutenant A. Matsipura and certain other young officers rehearse in this way. It was necessary to talk with them in detail and even organize demonstrative training exercises, which were summed up by flag-officer specialists who showed how much more effectively the training equipment can be used on shore....

How will it be now? At the present, much depends on the sonar operators. For now they are silent. Could it be possible that the "enemy" managed to escape pursuit? But to where? The unit's most experienced Warrant Officer V. Verner could not yet answer that question. At the most crucial point he took over the watch at the sonar station from the junior Lieutenant Kamyshev. It was not that he did not trust his subordinate. The petty officer was a sufficiently experienced specialist, but the tense situation was felt. Kamyshev was tired and his hearing, naturally, had become dull. The warrant officer cropped into the chair and carefully touched the set's tuning knobs. He "walked" through one sector, then another. A fine yellow beam glided over the greenish sonar screen. Suddenly, its tip flashed brightly--the response from the target.

The beam raced across the screen seven times. There was no doubt: it was contact with the "enemy" submarine. The rest, as Senior Lieutenant A. Matsipura put it after the attack, was a matter of equipment.

A few minutes passed from the instant of the "enemy" submarine's detection until weapons were used. The conventional salvo of the depth-charge rocket launchers and the torpedo strike were accurate.

12567

CSO: 1801/223

STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES

NEED FOR AND TRAINING OF STRATEGIC ROCKET FORCES CITED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 10 Oct 83)
pp 6-7

[Interview with Chief Marshal of Artillery V. F. Tolubko: "The Country's Strategic Shield"]

[Text] Hero of the Socialist Labor and Chief Marshall of Artillery Vladimir Fedorovich Tolubko was born in Krasnograd (now Kharkov Oblast). He has served in the Armed Forces since 1932. He completed the tank academy and the Military Academy of the mechanized and motorized RKKA [Workers and Peasants Red Army]. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded tank subunits and units and was chief of staff of the operations section of a mechanized corps. In the post-war years he completed the Military Academy of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff imeni K.E. Voroshilov, commanded units, groupings and formations and did staff work. In April 1968 he took over command of the Red Banner Siberian Military Districts forces and in May 1969 he assumed command of the Red Banner Far East Military District.

[Question] Comrade Chief Marshall of Artillery, please tell us when and why this new branch of the Armed Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces, appeared.

[Answer] After the great Patriotic War, the Soviet Union had to be concerned about strengthening its defensive capability because USA ruling circles began to conduct a policy of "from a position of power" against our country. This policy was accompanied by the arms race, atomic blackmail, the establishment of the anti-Soviet bloc and the threat of employing a "preventitive strike" against socialist countries.

In answer to the challenge by the hostile forces and to guarantee the security of the USSR and the elimination of the USA's atomic monopoly, the Communist Party and the Soviet government took the measures necessary for the development of our own nuclear missiles. Considering the character of the modern era, the correlation of power in the world's arena and the tendency in developing the means of armed conflict, in December 1959 the decision was

made to create a new branch of the Armed Forces, Strategic Rocket Forces. This decision was provoked by historical necessity.

I note that the development of missile technology is a long and complicated process and many Russian and Soviet scientists and designers took part in this. Here I must review a little history.

The first domestic military rockets, designed by the talented artilleryman A. Zasyadko, got their military baptism as early as the Russo-Turkish War from 1828 to 1829. They were fired from special mounts which, by the way, allowed salvo firing. In the Crimean War rockets designed by the famous Russian scientist and inventor K. Konstantinov were successfully used. He developed the basis of experimental rocketry dynamics and test-stand firing and defined the place for military rockets in the system of artillery fire.

After the Great October Socialist Revolution a new stage of rocket equipment development began. In the late 20's and early 30's rockets with liquid and solid fuel were tested in our country. The Soviet Air Force used solid propellant rocket rounds for the first time in the battles with Japanese militarists on the Khalkhin-Go River. On the eve of the Great Patriotic War the military got the multi-round rocket launcher, the famous "Katyusha."

The experience accumulated during the designing of rockets was very useful and as far back as October 1947 the first launch of a Soviet long-range ballistic missile took place. Ten years later, in August 1957, our country had the world's first test of an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The rapid development of missile technology allowed the creation of the most diverse types and designations of missiles. The "rocketeer" profession is one of the popular ones in the Armed Forces. The present base of Ground Force fire power is comprised of operational-tactical and tactical missiles along with artillery. There are also missiles found in PVO [Air Defense Forces], the Air Force and Navy.

However the most powerful missiles are in the Strategic Rocket Forces and they make up the foundation of USSR Armed Forces military power.

[Question] What are strategic rockets and what are their capabilities?

[Answer] The weapons of the Strategic Rocket Forces are primarily ballistic missiles with aerodynamic cylindrical bodies and cone-shaped nosecones (GCh) inside of which are nuclear charges (ther warhead, BCh).

The rocket motor is based on the jet principle. During the initial, or as we call it, the active part of the trajectory, the rocket gains the required speed. At a point determined by the program, when the rocket released the GCh (a monobloc or platform of deployable blocs), the motors switch off and the blocs fly by inertial force along a ballistic curve, the trajectory of a free, thrown body. During the final stage of flight the nosecone enters the dense atmospheric layers, flight slows and it strikes the target exactly.

When the GCh enters the dense atmospheric layers it heats up tremendously. Therefore, to preclude its destruction, special measures are taken.

Increasing missile flight range is done by adding stages which drive the nosecone to the speed required to reach the target. The altitude of intercontinental ballistic missiles at the trajectory apex is several hundred kilometers and they have practically unlimited range. Their speed is twenty times that of a modern fighter and ten times that of an artillery round's muzzle velocity.

In flight the missile is guided by onboard instruments which "collate" the set program with the actual information and through the guidance surfaces they guarantee motion along the calculated trajectory. Rocket motors have either solid or liquid fuel and are practically impervious to external conditions. Let's say that airplane engines use as oxidizers, the material necessary for fuel combustion, oxygen from the atmosphere. In rocket motors all the material necessary for its operation is onboard.

In a liquid fuel motor the oxidizer and fuel come together in a special tank by pumping or pressure. They mix and burn in the engine chamber. The gases formed by this have temperatures in excess of 3000 degrees. They expand in the jet nozzle and exit at tremendous speeds, creating a high thrust force.

In solid fuel rockets the substances that take part in the process have already been mixed in the burning chamber. They are designed more simply as there are no pumps and the number of mechanical elements is reduced.

[Question] What demands does service in the Strategic Rocket Forces put on soldiers?

[Answer] Strategic Rocket Forces are always on duty, fulfilling a military mission of special importance. These forces are continually combat ready, a forced, but necessary measure. They are the most important factor for containing the aggressive ambitions of imperialism which is trying, under cover of the lie of a "Soviet military threat," to change to its advantage the strategic military balance that has been formed, fanning the arms race and actively developing new types of nuclear missilery.

In a speech at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum Comrade Yu. V. Andropov noted that the "strategic military balance between socialism and imperialism objectively facilitates peaceful coexistence. Reaching this balance was one of the most important results of the last ten years. It requires our people and the peoples of the other socialist countries to expend great efforts and materials and we will not allow it to be broken."

We Soviet strategic rocketeers must always be on the alert to repulse any aggressor attempts to infringe in the achievements of socialism. Military duty demands from us maximum cohesion, courage and steadfastness, high military skills and the ability to act decisively and purposefully under conditions of great physical and psychological-moral stress.

I must say that the missiles themselves make a higher demand on personnel as they embody the latest achievements of science and technology. Mastering them is unthinkable without knowledge of automatic machines and remote control, electronics, ballistics, nuclear physics, mathematics, chemistry and a number of other sciences. Almost all the soldier-rocketeers have a secondary and higher education and received basic training in DOSAAF organizations. This allows them to master the most complicated equipment quickly and become rated specialists. Officer cadre trained in all aspects are at the head of units and subunits. More than 70 percent of officer-rocketeers have had engineer training, almost all have rate qualifications and one third are masters of military affairs.

Collectivism has special meaning for rocketeers. Our weapons are crew served. They require coordinated, clear action by all of the specialists and of each crew member. Constant attention is put on indoctrinating collectivism, military friendship and comradeship in our Forces.

[Question] Comrade Chief Marshall of Artillery, how do you indoctrinate the rocketeers with all the qualities you just listed?

[Answer] The question of indoctrinating personnel with high political vigilance, teaching them to master the skills necessary for the equipment and weapons and strengthening organizational discipline is always at the center of attention of the military council, commanders, staffs, political departments and party and Komsomol organizations. Material from the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, scientific methods and work forms are widely used for resolving these issues.

I will use the experiences gained in the units where officers I. Shelstov and V. Krupnin serve as an example. Primary significance in these military collectives was given to indoctrinating soldiers with devotion to the business of the Communist Party, love for the Motherland and readiness to defend her courageously and steadfastly. They are tirelessly concerned about the personnel's feeling of military friendship and comradeship, high personal responsibility for the irreproachable fulfillment of their duty and functional responsibilities. They actively struggle to fully use every minute of training time. During specialist training and the arrangement of combat crews and subunits, special attention is paid to the practical development of combat training missions and norms at individual and systems trainers. Each activity and training run is permeated with the spirit of competition, high demands and the irreproachable fulfillment of all instructions and exhortations is guaranteed.

The material training base of the Strategic Rocket Force has also improved. At the present time, classes produce their own laboratory complexes with training missiles, control panels, apparatus, automated stands and electrical systems. This allows them to fully carry out all operations under conditions closely approaching combat.

Proper selection of soldier specialists in subunits and combat crews is very important for us. The introduction of scientific methods for studying the

individual capabilities of people and for determining their professional suitability helps accomplish this selection process. It significantly reduces the time for introducing crew members into crews and allows the qualitative resolution of problems of interchangeability, arrangement and solidarity of the military collective.

[Question] Rocketeer military skills can be successfully checked in training. But in peacetime how do you verify their courage and valour and the ability not to lose their heads in difficult conditions?

[Answer] These qualities are verified by the military life of our Forces. Thus, Sergeant Yu. Gillerovich was assigned the mission of degreasing the fuel storage tank. He began to test the air. However, the gas concentration was very high. The sergeant lost consciousness and fell. Private A. Kistanov was the first to notice the accident. He quickly jumped into the tank and tried to lift his comrade, but choking himself, he fell to the bottom. Others came to help and they sent in a stream of air. Kistanov regained consciousness first and dragged Gillerovich to the top. Both their lives were saved.

Lieutenant of Engineers V. Basov at the cost of his own life eliminated a fault that had arisen and saved his comrade-in-arms. By order of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium he was awarded the Order of the Red Star posthumously for courage and valour displayed in the fulfillment of military duty.

[Question] And one last question, Comrade Chief Marshall of Artillery. With what successes are the rocketeers celebrating their own holiday, the Day of Rocket Forces and Artillery?

[Answer] Military rocketeers reached new, higher limits in military skills and performance of duty. The number of outstanding units and subunits, outstanding ratings in training, rated specialists and masters of military affairs has grown. The absolute majority of training launches received a rating of excellent.

We see our successes as a platform for further advances along the path toward perfecting military and political knowledge. Strategic Rocket Forces are and will continue in the future to be a reliable shield for peace and peaceful work of the Soviet people, the peoples of the fraternal socialist countries and a screen on the path of imperialist reaction which is nurturing wild plans of "crusades" against communism and plans for world domination.

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CIVIL DEFENSE

CIVIL DEFENSE TRAINING PROBLEMS CITED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 10 Oct 83) pp 32-33

[Article by P. Grishchuk, chief, Department of Naval and Radio Training, Central Committee DOSAAF USSR: "Indoctrinate"]

[Text] It was noted at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum that we must significantly improve the leadership of ideological and mass political work. Accomplishing the tasks assigned by the plenum demands from us further improvement of this work and an increase in its influence on all aspects of DOSAAF organizational activities and especially of training which applies to naval schools which train specialists both for naval service and for the national economy.

It is not necessary to demonstrate what a major role indoctrination plays in training future military men. In the short time a cadet is at school instructors and masters must help him fully realize his responsibility to defend the Motherland, understand his military duty and thoroughly master his military specialty.

The problems of increasing the effectiveness of cadet indoctrination in defense society schools is troubling many people. This is shown by the sharing of teacher experiences that was conducted by the magazine. The material published ("What Was Hidden Behind the ChP [Extraordinary Occurrence]" V. Shirshov--No 1, 1983, "By the Law of the Collective" V. Fedorov--No 3, 1983, "We Are Teaching Discipline" V. Timofeyev--No 5, 1983, "A Patriot's Duty" D. Nikolayenko--No 6, 1983, "Passing Loyalty On" V. Teterevlev--No 9, 1983) allows one to conclude that school leaders, teachers and masters are concerned about how best to organize their pupils, what they should give up and what they should put their attention on.

In our opinion the deputy chief of training and indoctrination at the Sverdlovsk Naval School V. Shirshov raised an interesting question in his article "What Is Behind ChP." "Is it possible to foresee all the nuances in indoctrination work or at least to lower the risk level while working with premilitary age youth?" asks the author, having in mind that young people attend school a short time. In literally several weeks it is necessary not only to train them and give them a specialty, but also to inspire them as to

the important: the moral-political and psychological quality of military sailors is and to reach the point where the convictions inspired in them remain throughout their lives. This must be done without deviation and without fail. And so as not to error and to quickly find the key to each sailor, it is necessary to immediately expose the peculiarities, to get to the bottom of the drafter's.

The author of the article notes that the school has been trying to think about this better. Is it possible to speed up the process of familiarization with the novices and guard against errors? They conducted an experiment. On the first day of training they ordered all students to write the answers to questions given them. Here are some of those questions. "Do you have friends?" "Do you fight with them?" "What are your hobbies?" "Did you willingly enroll in the navy school?" "What is your understanding of duty?" "How do you relate to discipline? To authority?" More than 20 questions were given in all. Their purpose was for determining the individual qualities of the

trainees. The material from the questions allowed them to introduce corrections into the plans for the indoctrination work. It became more effective and succeeded in exciting an interest for specialties and, as a consequence, raised the level of specialty training. This was noted in letters received from ship and unit commanders in the fleet.

The article notes that the experience gained is worthy of attention although we are far from thinking that filling out forms will solve all problems. The main thing is the daily, laborious study of a cadet's qualities and thoughtful reflection on them.

It is necessary to stress the significance of moral indoctrination. This is a requirement of the times. Speaking at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Comrade Yu. B. Andropov said, "The party is obliged to indoctrinate man not simply as the bearer of the essence of true morality, but primarily as a citizen of the socialist society, and an inheritor of communism, with ideological direction, morals and interests, a sense of work and behavior."

The training organization of the defense society prepares draftees for military service. And we must be aware of the fact that in essence there are no areas in a military man's life where moral demands would not apply. Draftees must be indoctrinated with this spirit while they are still in the navy school. We will dwell in greater length on this point, especially those points which teachers should consider in indoctrination work.

The issues of a military man's moral perfection hold in indoctrination work a progressively more important place which is stipulated along with factors and conditions. In the first place, this is caused by the increase in the role of moral factors in military affairs. The unprecedented destructive power of weapons, the decisiveness and dynamics of military operations and

the increased danger of a sudden attack by the aggressor are all making exceptionally high demands on the moral-military qualities of Soviet fighting man.

The firm moral tempering of personnel is the most important condition for increasing the military preparedness of the Army and Navy and winning the war. An indestructible moral spirit is an organic part of the firm alloy that determines the military potential of the Soviet Armed Forces.

The significance of moral tempering is stipulated secondly by the indoctrinational role which the Soviet Armed Forces play in our society. Our Army and Navy, and the voluntary defense society as well, were and are a school for bravery, diligence and high morality.

Third, the moral indoctrination of fighting men, and in DOSAAF, of cadets in the training organizations, acquires special importance in view of the social changes taking place in society and consequently in the Armed Forces and in view of the improvements in social relations.

The pedagogical collective of navy schools must be guided by these conditions while organizing the moral indoctrination of cadets.

It seems that the question of the authority of instructors and tutors is advisably raised, a question that was like Lenin sharply raised at the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum.

In order to have the moral right to guide, teach and indoctrinate, a chief, an instructor, or a master must himself set the example for fulfilling his service duty, be a man of honor, principles, decency, and discipline and have a proper relationship with subordinates. When all teachers rigidly adhere to these high moral norms, business in the school collective succeeds, indoctrination work is conducted effectively and the Armed Forces gets valuable replacements.

In this regard we can refer to the experience of the chief of the Zhdanov model navy school Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Bal'. He is the spirit of the collective. He is responsive and ready at any moment to help an instructor, master or cadet, but at the same time he is firm in his own decisions, principled and demanding. The Zhdanov navy school is one of the best in the defense society and was awarded the challenge Red Banner of the USSR VMF [navy] Glavkom. Its chief was honored with the medal "For Military Service."

One can also say many warm words about A. I. Cherednik. He was the chief of the Novopossiysk Navy School for a long time. He took it from a backward school to one of the leaders and was awarded the Order of the Red Star. And not long ago he himself expressed the desire to head the Saratov Navy School which was in exceptionally dire straits because of its former chief. We have no doubt that under his skilled leadership and with the help of the DOSAAF obkom the Saratov School will be one of the leaders.

But unfortunately there are examples of other situations. Take the Astrakhan Navy School for example. If any school had all the advantages (the sea is

right there) to become a model, it was this one. By the way, it was a model until recently. But it could not hold the honored rank. An inspection exposed serious omissions in its work. They ceased being concerned about teachers' authority and weakened the indoctrination work with teachers and masters. It went to the point that masters O. Mikhaylov and V. Repin were almost not prepared for their lessons, allowed omissions and formalism and were not concerned about their own professional growth. To hide their own carelessness, or more exactly their lack of responsibility, they liberally overstated cadets' evaluations. As a result many cadets became careless in training, knowing that in any event they would get good grades. These masters had to be severely warned. And they had to apply extreme measures to another worker in that school, S. Grin'ko. He was dismissed for violating the work discipline many times and for low moral qualities.

Many other deficiencies were uncovered in the work of the collective in this training organization. And they would not have had them if the city DOSAAF committee had paid more attention to the school and had been more seriously concerned about the selection of personnel and their moral indoctrination.

Here is another example. The former chief of the Krasnoyarsk Navy School G. Grachev was self-willed and opposed his own collective. In five years he changed the composition of teachers in the training organization three times, dismissed and punished the innocent and guilty without trial and made his people unwelcomed. Grachev was relieved of the position he held.

Certainly such occurrences are isolated. But we cannot reassure ourselves with this. We must actively develop in the leading cadre such traits as modesty, the skill of relying on the collective, accessibility for contact with people, and the correct attitude to criticism.

Cadets should be indoctrinated with the example of the outstanding teachers who are in the overwhelming majority in navy schools. One can apply the proverb "it is not the position that makes the man, but the man who makes the position" to them. Their success in indoctrination work is possible because of their demanding attitude to their work, the skill in daily and hourly promoting every cadet to follow moral norms which are strengthened by the rules of the internal daily routine in the navy school, to be diligent in training and to prepare themselves conscientiously for military service.

And finally, it is difficult to imagine moral indoctrination without working. The army and navy don't need softies, just as they are not needed in the national economy. Cadets must know that on a ship or in a unit they have to do a lot of jobs, some of which are dirty, to stand difficult mobile watches and duty. They have to be trained for this while they are still in school.

One should not forget about the legal indoctrination of future fighting men. Why hide the fact that often not knowing the measures for punishment and the degree of responsibility for something is a disciplinary violation. Winking at those who break rules has been observed in some schools and it leads to this becoming a behavioral norm. We must organize the business of indoctrination in schools such that violators of discipline know that punishment or some other action is inevitable. Without discipline there is no collective. And all educators must master this.

CIVIL DEFENSE

IMPROVING CIVIL DEFENSE PROPAGANDA DISCUSSED

Moscow VOYENNYE ZNANIYA in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 10 Oct 83)
pp 8-9

[Article by Colonel General V. Dement'yev, deputy chief, Civil Defense Political Organization: "Actively and Creatively--Some Questions on Further Improvement of Civil Defense Propaganda in View of Requirements of June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and the main speech by CPSU Central Committee General Secretary Comrade Yu. V. Andropov marked an important ideological-political event in the life of the party and of all Soviet people. The Plenum, having thoroughly analyzed the socio-economic, political and cultural problems of the developed socialist community, reviewed the state of affairs on the ideological front from all aspects and with high party principles. They also reviewed the plan for fulfilling the decisions of the 26th Party Congress and of the CPSU Central Committee of 26 April 1983 on ideology and determined the basic direction of ideological-indocrination and propaganda work for today and in the future. The main methods for further improving ideological and mass political work and their results were set in its material and decisions. Offense and realism, truthfulness and efficiency, skillful use of socialism's achievements, thoughtful analysis of issues that concern people, freshness of thought and clarity of statement--these must distinguish the daily activity of the soldiers on the ideological front.

Comrade Yu. V. Andropov said, "We have the richest arsenal of media for enlightening and indoctrinating. There is printed material, radio, television and oral propaganda and a huge network of various types of scientific institutions... For them, the business at hand is to use all of these media more correctly and to apply them more actively and creatively..."

At the Central Committee Plenum a lot of attention was placed on the military-patriotic indoctrination of Soviet peoples and especially of the young. This is needed because of the sharply aggravated international situation and the increased anti-Soviet propaganda and "psychological war" which imperialist states have developed against the USSR and countries of the socialist community.

As is known, one of the effective ways of indoctrinating the Soviet people is civil defense propaganda used to indoctrinate personnel of the non-militarized

GO [civil defense] formations and the general population with high moral-political and psychological qualities, firm conviction in the invincibility of our Armed Forces' military might and the effectiveness of measures for civil defense. Propaganda's role and significance in mobilizing the Soviet peoples to active participation in mass defensive measures and to fulfill their constitutional responsibilities for strengthening the defensive capacity of the country are continuously growing.

Definite, positive changes have been attained in improving the quality and effectiveness of propaganda measures and GO staffs' role as an organizer has increased in this area. They have qualified cadres of propagandists available and the arsenal of media used by local party and soviet organs to attain these goals is expanding. In the Lithuanian SSR alone, in addition to the mass media they can use 800 museums, rooms and nooks of revolutionary, military and labor glory, more than 900 classes for initial military training and civil defense, a large number of GO courses and locations, 69 supporting secondary schools, 55 military-patriotic indoctrination sections and the propaganda of the "Znanie" society. The republic has approximately 1200 cultural-educational institutions, 2500 libraries and 150 movie theaters. These same capabilities are found in all republics, krays and oblasts.

An example of active and creative civil defense propaganda took place in the Estonian SSR during preparation and conduct of large-scale exercises on economic objectives. The use of oral propaganda was especially stressed here. Invitations to propagandists resounded in work collectives, educational institutions and residences. Military leaflets, express leaflets, wall-newspapers and photomontages were issued. Booklets dedicated to the participants of the exercises, including communicators, firemen and scouts were published. Movie exhibitions were run in Tallin's theaters. Films on civil defense were shown and hearings and viewings were organized for radio and television. We noted that these measures were conducted at a high ideological-political and methodological level. The efforts of indoctrinators actively helped resolve training missions successfully and also helped raise staff and service readiness of the non-militarized GO formations and the worker collectives to defend against weapons of mass destruction.

Unfortunately things are far from being done like this everywhere. Often propagandistic measures go idly by, without the required return. In some areas propagandists do not work with people and the results of GO propaganda is evaluated by the number of lectures. Besides that, at times they are not effective. Lectures are presented and talks, seminars and other things conducted during the preparation and conduct of exercises. But the results of a number of exercises show that the leadership and commanders of the formations have little practical skill in leading, the population doesn't know its civil defense duties and especially doesn't have the ability to defend against radioactive contamination and, as it happens, they don't know how to react to notification signals. This means that the propagandists' work went for nothing.

One of the basic missions of propaganda and mass political work is training Soviet people to fulfill their duties in civil defense conscientiously, to

help teach workers and employees and the total population the methods of defending against weapons of mass destruction. Therefore it is necessary to conduct such propaganda in concert with the training-indoctrination process, differentiating among the different population groups. This more than anything else must be the focal point of the primary propaganda effort, including oral, visual, printed, radio and television.

The successful completion of these missions depends on the daily initiative work of GO staffs, on their constant business-like contact with governmental and social organizations, on the mass media, and on their ability to give qualified aid. For example, a practical science conference on the theme, "The Condition and Measures for Improving Civil Defense Propaganda in View of the 26th Party Congress and the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum" was held on the initiative of GO staffs in the Ukraine SSR and Kiev under the leadership of the Kiev Gorkom KPU [Ukrainian Communist Party]. Representatives of the party, professional and Komsomol organizations, DOSAAF, the "Znanie" Society, Red Cross, mass information media, cultural, national education and city housing commission workers and GO staffs and courses took part in it. During the discussion they thoroughly analyzed the experience of propagandists in the area of the economy and living sector. Specific recommendations were developed taking into consideration the peculiarities of each organization. They were directed at improving civil defense propaganda and increasing participation of state and social organizations and mass media in this area.

In Latvia the Central Committee of the republic's Communist Party held a press conference for workers of republic, city and rayon newspapers, radio and television. Chief of the republic's GO staff, Major General Kh. Abol, gave a speech commissioned by the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee. He acquainted journalists with the problems of civil defense at the contemporary level and with its propaganda missions. Informing a significant percentage of the ideological front workers can undoubtedly raise the effectiveness of the civil defense material published in newspapers and can also improve radio and television programs on the same subject.

At the same time the study of the state of affairs in areas shows that some GO staffs and ASSR, kray and oblast deputy GO chiefs of staff for propaganda are not totally using the very rich possibilities which mass media make available to them and also such social organizations as professional unions, Komsomol, DOSAAF, SOKK [Red Cross and Red Crescent Society] and the CPSU and "Znanie" society.

Guided by the requirements of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and relying on accumulated experience, civil defense staffs and courses must constantly improve the forms and methods of joint work with state and social organizations and for providing real creative collaboration with workers of radio and television stations and local journalists to develop specific programs and publications.

Local party organizations of GO staffs and courses have been seriously discussing methods for realizing the demands of the June 1983 CPSU Central

Committee Plenum. The speeches by Communists and the adopted decisions have clearly reflected the idea that has resounded in the Plenum: develop in the consciousness of Communists and all citizens of our country that this is the mission not only for professional ideologists, propagandists and workers of the mass media, but for the whole party. Active participation in ideological-indoctrination work and civil defense propaganda is the paramount duty of each Communist and all GO activists. And it is important to conduct this work skillfully and effectively, and by word and deed to indoctrinate in people a conscientious attitude towards fulfilling their duties and a high feeling of responsibility.

We do not have examples of such an attitude to business and to skillful delivery of mass political work and GO propaganda. Information on current events and reviews of VOYENNYE ZNANIYA are being conducted, and lectures given on social-political themes in the staffs and GO courses of the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Latvia, Estonia, Moscow, Leningrad and the Leningrad Oblast and others. Officers and employees of these staffs are doing a lot of propaganda work in GO subjects in the national economic sector. The constantly operating city and rayon lecturing bureaus are working on these issues in Moscow, Leningrad, in all the capitals of the union republics and in a number of kray and oblast centers.

Under the leadership of party organs communists of many civil defense staffs are conducting propaganda in different ways, taking into account the missions assigned to the various population groups. Together with the "Znanie" society organizations they are going out into remote rural areas as members of party organ lecturers. Automobile clubs of GO courses and cultural institutions equipped with film capabilities and various visual appliances are being used towards these goals.

Thus the Communists of the GO staff in Talas Oblast and Toktogul Rayon (Kirghiz SSR) actively participated in the work by groups of propagandists who went out into the far distant pastures. The cattle breeders heard lectures not only on socio-political and economic issues, but also on civil defense. Such trips are being organized in Leningrad and a number of other oblasts in the RSFSR, and the Belorussian, Kazakh, Armenian and Tajik SSRs.

Certainly, a lot is being accomplished. However, in light of the requirements of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, a strict and exacting analysis of civil defense propaganda shows that our capabilities for improving its qualitative level and effectiveness are far from fully utilized and there are important defects in its organization.

It is well known that the population and the personnel of the non-militarized formations need comprehensive knowledge and skills in defending against modern destructive means, in conducting SNAVR [rescue and emergency reconstruction work] in centers of destruction and in the event of natural calamity. Therefore the propaganda activities of GO agencies are unthinkable without wide participation by specialists of various civil defense services. Thus in the Zhitomir Oblast communists on the GO staff with the blessing of the party obkom and oblispolkol thoroughly studied the possibilities for

participation by workers of several services in civil defense propaganda. It turned out that they were against this important matter. At seminar-meetings chiefs of services listened to an instructive lecture on the forms and methods of GO propaganda and changed their minds on this issue. The leaders got recommendations on an excellent theme for lectures and reports and necessary literature and they were given advice on developing visual propaganda. These initiatives were worthy of being studied and disseminated.

Courses have a significant role in civil defense propaganda. In accordance with the proposition on courses, they are the centers of methodological training work for disseminating the foremost experience of conducting civil defense, for propaganda, the moral-political and psychological training of GO forces and the population of a given rayon, city, oblast and republic. This, for example, instructors and masters of industrial training for republic, city and rayon GO courses of the Latvian SSR as members of a section of the "Znanie" society regularly speak out on civil defense themes actively participate in the preparation and conduct of day, week and month long GO campaigns, review competitions and quizzes. They are conducting various propaganda measures among school and pioneer camps and also with the inhabitants at their residences.

In a number of places GO course workers in addition give methodological help to information agencies and social organizations in training, instructing the activists and in equipping methodological training classes and studies. They help in the development of lectures, reports and conversations on civil defense themes, review manuscripts, publish material and speak on the radio and television. Rendering methodological training aid to economic organizations has a special place in the work of courses. First-hand contact with working people enriches the very workers of the courses with the experience and produces higher demands for improving the methods of teaching and indoctrinating the listeners. This is how the staffs and courses on the Ukrainian, Georgian and Estonian SSRs, the Udmurt and Chuvash ASSSRs and the Kuybyshev, Bryansk, Lvov, Gomel and Karaganda Oblasts. As we see, there where they genuinely get down to work, the questions of active participation by the courses in civil defense propaganda in light of the new requirements are resolved in a business-like manner.

However there are still important deficiencies. Serious flaws are still allowed today in some courses in the lectures that are developed and read and these certainly have an adverse effect on the listeners' training. The necessary work of refreshing the contents of methodological materials dictated by the changes in the international situation and domestic life of the country is not done. Frequently lectures are read as they were written and received from the senior GO staff, without putting the local positive experience into them.

It is necessary to say that in the staffs and GO courses the weak link today is GO propaganda by visual means. The primary defect is that it has no specific target, poor content and is carelessly developed. In a number of places it doesn't operationally reflect the events of domestic and

international life. The best collectives and foremost people who have attained positive results in resolving civil defense missions are not propagandized sufficiently or significantly.

To data senior staffs, studying the work of their subordinates, don't summarize and disseminate the positive results. And indeed this is a major deficiency. The progressive method of an economic, city and rayon unit is a valuable property. And it has an important place in the planning of civil defense propaganda.

The June 1983 CPUS Central Committee Plenum stressed that we must concretely turn more often to the progressive methods proven by life itself and must more daringly appropriate the best things into our arsenal. We ought to thoroughly analyze our deficiencies and omissions and take measures to remove them. This is the direct way to improving all of our work.

The contemporary international situation and the increased civil defense missions require that we decisively eliminate the elements of pacifism still seen in oral and printed propaganda and in a timely fashion, without compromise, rebuff any manifestation of bourgeois ideology and fabrication of Western propaganda concerning the goals and missions of Soviet civil defense. We must more widely use our arsenal of propaganda means for indoctrinating the Soviet peoples with high political vigilance.

Those people who have well-grounded theoretical knowledge will be able to successfully conduct civil defense propaganda, and can simply and clearly explain any complicated question. Therefore GO workers and activists in social organizations must tirelessly raise the level of their ideological-theoretical knowledge and improve their propaganda and pedagogical skills. Only in this way can we raise the effectiveness of GO propaganda and conduct propaganda activities as the party requires.

The decisions of the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Planum are a military program of activities. The active, purposeful work of completing it guarantees the further improvement of the quality and effectiveness of civil defense propaganda and the successful resolution of the missions of its personnel and of every Soviet person for strengthening the defensive capability of our Motherland.

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MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES' ENTRANCE REQUIREMENTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Jan 84 p 4

[Editorial: "For Those Who Want To Become Officers"]

[Text] Military schools, institutes and the Bandmaster Department are accepting males from among civilian youth, soldiers, sailors, sergeants and senior sergeants of all branches of service, regardless of their military specialty, who have completed a secondary education, are in good health and are suited for training in military institutions and who successfully pass competitive entrance examinations. Enrollment ages are from 17 to 21 (must be 17 the year of admission). Warrant officers and servicemen who have re-enlisted are accepted for training up to 23 years old.

Army and Navy warrant officers have the right to enroll in officer training schools, including for flight training, upon completion of 2 years of service in a warrant officer or officer position and servicemen who have re-enlisted may enroll after 2 years have expired on their re-enlistment term.

Servicemen on either their initial or a re-enlistment term who want to enroll for training are to submit a report before 25 February through the chain of command addressed to the unit commander. Civilians are to submit a statement to the rayvoyenkom [Rayon military registration and enlistment office] where they live by 30 April on the year they desire admittance.

Servicemen are to include the following information in the report: military rank, last name, first name and patronymic, duty position, date of birth, civilian and military education and designation and the name of the military training institution where admittance is desired. Attach the following to the report: documentation on secondary school education (a copy of the attestation, evidence, certification, diploma), party or Komsomol references, 3 certified photographs (without headgear, 4.5 X 6 cm size), an autobiography, service references, service card and a copy of the birth certificate.

Civilians are to include in their statement the following: last name, first name and patronymic, birth year and month, home address and designation, military training, institute or faculty to which admittance is desired. Attach to the statement the following: an autobiography, reference from work or training location, party or Komsomol references, a copy of secondary

school documentation (secondary school students give information on current successes), a copy of the birth certificate and 3 certified photographs (without headgear, 4.5 X 6 cm size).

Komsomolites recommended for training by Komsomol raykoms (gorkoms) are to attach an All-Union Komsomol authorization.

Candidates are to show a passport, military card or a signed certificate, authentic documents on secondary education and a birth certificate to the acceptance commission upon arrival at the institute.

Entrance exams are held in the following subjects:

--For senior command and engineering schools, pilot and navigator training and navy schools, for the Military Engineering Institute imeni A.F. Mozhayskiy and the majority of other military training institutes: Russian language and literature, mathematics (written), mathematics and physics (oral);

--For senior military political schools: Russian language and literature (written), mathematics, USSR history and geography (oral);

--For secondary military schools: Russian language and literature (written) and mathematics (oral).

Those entering the Lvov Senior Military Political School will take an exam on Russian language and literature (oral) instead of a mathematics exam. Those enrolling in the senior chemical defense school and the logistics school will take an oral exam on chemistry instead of a written mathematics exam. Those enrolling in the Yaroslav Senior Finance School imeni General of the Army A.V. Khrulev will take an oral geography exam in place of the physics exam.

Candidates enrolling in the Military Institute are tested in Russian language and literature (written and oral), USSR history and a foreign language, but for the Military Institute of Physical Training, they are tested in Russian language and literature (written), biology and chemistry (oral); physical training and sports (practical).

At the Bandmaster Department at the Moscow State Conservatory imeni P.I. Tchaikovski entrants are tested in Russian language and literature (written), USSR history (oral) and in music: harmony and solfeggio (oral), military orchestra instruments and conducting (practical).

Warrant officer candidates as a rule take entrance exams in armament equipment, mathematics, physics and regulations common to all services.

Candidates who arrive at military training institutes undergo medical examinations and those enrolling in flight and navy institution additionally undergo professional psychological screening.

Additionally, to evaluate physical training, service candidates are given a practical test on exercises from the Military Sports Complex of the USSR Armed Forces. Civilians are tested on exercises from the All-Union Complex "Ready For Work and Defense of the USSR."

People who have been awarded USSR orders and medals for personal accomplishments or for high results in military and political training and servicemen on an initial or re-enlistment term who have been rated outstanding in military and political training for at least 1 year, with a statement to this effect in their military unit orders, are accepted without the competition aspect if they received a favorable mark on the entrance exams.

People completing secondary school with a medal or secondary specialized training institutes with a "cum laude" diploma are accepted into secondary level military training schools without entrance exams; for enrollment into senior military training schools they are to take an exam in one of the disciplines. If they receive an "excellent" evaluation they are excused from further exams, but if they receive a "good" or "satisfactory" they must take entrance exams in the remaining disciplines.

When applying to a secondary military school, graduates of general educational secondary schools who have received certificates of merit "For Special Successes in the Study of Individual Subjects" are excused from the entrance exam on the subject for which they received the award, if that subject is one of the entrance exams.

Entrance exams for military training institutes are conducted from 15 June through 5 August (for Army and Navy warrant officers, from 20 June through 20 August). For servicemen they are conducted by the traveling entrance commission from 5 June through 5 July.

Voyenkomats and unit commanders are to send candidates to entrance exams when called for by the school chiefs. Candidates are provided free travel and, upon arrival at the school, free room and board.

All graduates of military training schools and the Department are awarded the rank of lieutenant, lieutenant of Engineers or lieutenant of Technical Service and are given a diploma on the All-Union model for higher or secondary special military education and a breast pin for completing a military training institution.

Detailed information about military training institutions and admission rules can be obtained at military commissariats or unit staffs.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

STRUCTURE, OPERATIONS OF U.S. RECONNAISSANCE PLATOON DESCRIBED

Moscow ZNAMENOSSETS in Russian No 11, Nov 83 (signed to press 25 Oct 83)
pp 26-27

[Article by Col Z. Moseyev from foreign press materials: "NATO Armies: Organization, Weaponry, Tactics: A Platoon on Reconnaissance"; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in boldface in source]

[Text] In building up their military potential, aggressive U.S. circles are giving considerable attention to improving the organizational structure, weaponry and operating tactics of the reconnaissance subunits. American military specialists proceed from the assumption that under conditions of a situation constantly changing in the course of maneuverable combat actions, reconnaissance often will have a deciding effect on the outcome of modern combined-arms combat. A conclusion is drawn in this regard that the reconnaissance platoon in particular must have that organization, weaponry and outfitting which would assure the performance of active, continuous reconnaissance in the interests of companies and battalions.

Just what reconnaissance forces and means are in American Army battalions and companies? We will note that ORGANIC reconnaissance forces and means are organizationally part of mechanized infantry (infantry), airmobile, airborne and tank companies and battalions. The reconnaissance platoon of a fire support company of the mechanized infantry or infantry battalion is the most typical in its T/O&E structure. It consists of a platoon headquarters and two reconnaissance sections. The platoon has a total of 30 persons (27 in an infantry battalion), one M113A1 APC and nine M114A1 APC's (or combat reconnaissance vehicles). Lately reconnaissance platoons have been equipped primarily with combat reconnaissance vehicles. The platoon has ten radios and observation and reconnaissance devices. (A type organization is shown in Diagram No 1 [diagram not reproduced]).

The reconnaissance platoon in an air assault or airborne battalion also is part of the battalion fire support company, but it has certain specific features. It consists of a platoon headquarters and two reconnaissance sections, each with two squads of six persons each. The squad has two reconnaissance vehicles. This company's radar section includes two squads of medium radars (four persons in each) and two squads of light radars with six persons each. The section is equipped with four AN/PPS-5 radars and six radios.

Mechanized infantry or infantry companies have ground observer sections and 81-mm mortar forward observer teams or groups. They set up observation posts which work together with the reconnaissance platoons. These sections and teams are equipped with optical devices (binoculars, stereoscopic telescopes, aiming circles and theodolites), and lately they also have been equipped with laser rangefinders.

The U.S. Army command is constantly carrying out measures to further improve the tactical capabilities of the forces and means of reconnaissance subunits. For example, a new XM800 fighting vehicle (BRM [combat reconnaissance vehicle]) has been introduced to the T/O&E's of reconnaissance platoons in the wheeled and tracked versions. It weighs 8 tons and is armed with a 20-mm or 30-mm gun with coaxial machinegun, and it has a crew of three.

As reported by the journal INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE REVIEW, an amphibious BRM, the XM3, armed with a 25-mm automatic gun, ten TOW ATGM's and a 7.62-mm machinegun and equipped with the AN/PPS-15 radar for reconnoitering moving ground targets also has been developed for the reconnaissance subunit. It has a crew of five (vehicle commander, observer, two gunners and a driver-mechanic).

All battalion and company reconnaissance subunits are equipped with infrared devices, thermal direction finders and equipment for detecting infrared sources of illumination. The operating range of illuminated neutron-optical devices depends on the power of the infrared searchlight and is around 1.5 km.

In performing their assigned missions, the reconnaissance subunits can be reinforced with combat engineers, weapons and communications equipment and can be supported by reconnaissance and fire support helicopters.

American specialists believe that the reconnaissance platoon can perform quite varied combat missions. The nature and methods of performing these missions are set forth in manuals and regulations of NATO countries. Primarily, however, a reconnaissance platoon's actions are aimed at performing route reconnaissance, screening exposed flanks and gaps between subunits, and performing surveillance. A reconnaissance platoon also is employed to reinforce or replace subunits which have come under nuclear attack. The platoon also can be used to combat enemy groups which have penetrated to battalion rear services locations, they can be employed as the battalion commander's reserve after commitment of the second echelon company, and they can perform other missions including fighting together with line subunits.

As noted in American manuals, during a march and in anticipation of a meeting engagement the platoon may perform reconnaissance for prompt detection of the advancing enemy at the greatest possible distance and determine his strength and weapons, and above all the presence of missile and tank subunits and means of nuclear attack. In this situation the platoon performs reconnaissance in a zone up to one kilometer wide and at a distance up to 10-15 km from the main body. It stands to reason that the platoon's order of movement and actions depend on the battlefield situation, nature of terrain and the enemy forces.

The platoon commander sends patrols on foot or in vehicles forward and to the flanks to the distance of visual communications. On encountering enemy reconnaissance or march security, the reconnaissance patrol reports this to the commander without engaging in combat, moves under cover to the main body and on rendezvousing with it, takes cover and continues reconnaissance by surveillance.

When the reconnaissance platoon is operating on close terrain difficult to negotiate, it can be given a reconnaissance helicopter in attachment, which flies at low altitude and informs the platoon commander and patrol about the situation in the zone of operations and about obstacles and various barriers along the route. In this instance the helicopter directs platoon actions, guides it to reconnaissance objectives and if necessary supports its actions by fire. When a meeting engagement strikes up the reconnaissance patrol uses exposed flanks and gaps in combat formations in attempting to determine the boundaries between enemy subunits, their deployment lines, particularly of the main body, and locations of enemy weapons, control points and reserves.

During preparations for and in the course of an attack the reconnaissance platoon usually tries to uncover the location of targets or objectives against which nuclear and missile strikes must be delivered and tries to establish the fire plan of all kinds of weapons on the enemy forward edge of defense and in the depth, and deployment areas of artillery, mortars, PTUR [antitank guided missiles], ZUR [surface-to-air guided missiles] and radars.

According to American views, the reconnaissance platoon usually is employed centrally, but in some instances its squads may be attached to mechanized infantry (or infantry), tank and airborne companies. American manuals direct that in an attack from immediate contact with the enemy, the reconnaissance platoon advances behind the combat formation of the battalion's first echelon companies in readiness to perform reconnaissance in the breakthrough sector in a direction given it. At the same time, it observes the opposite side and captures prisoners and documents to establish the numerical designations, subordination and order of battle of the enemy subunits and the enemy's forces and weapons. At the end of fire preparation the reconnaissance patrol begins advancing into the depth of enemy defense in combat formations of a second echelon company or on one of its flanks. In case breaches are found in the combat formation of defending enemy subunits, the reconnaissance patrol pushes forward, outstripping its own attacking subunits, and moves onto its given axis for performing reconnaissance. Its distance from friendly forces may reach 15 km.

When the company or battalion is on defense, American specialists believe that the reconnaissance platoon can perform the following missions: detection of the enemy main body while still on the march; determination of the direction of his subunits' movement, their composition, assembly areas (especially for missile-artillery and tank subunits), locations of control points, time and method of their movement into the attack, and axis of main attack.

If a defense is being conducted outside of contact with the opposing side, a reconnaissance platoon functions in the forward defense area security zone and

in the vicinity of the battle outpost position. In this case scouts receive information about the enemy through observation and by moving stealthily along a route parallel to the enemy's movement. Features of a reconnaissance platoon's actions during defensive combat outside of contact with the enemy are shown in Diagram No 2 [diagram not reproduced].

As the foreign press reports, the operating tactics of the reconnaissance platoon continue to be perfected during numerous exercises and maneuvers both of NATO's Joint Armed Forces and during independent American Army exercises. Here reconnaissance subunit personnel practice intensively, above all in a spirit of hatred of nations of the USSR and other socialist countries.

Under these conditions Soviet soldiers' high vigilance and constant combat readiness are a guarantee that any aggressive acts by the imperialists will be prevented promptly.

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